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CHINA’S SOE REFORM: USING WTO RULES TO BUILD A MARKET ECONOMY 
Weihuan Zhou, Henry Gao & Xue Bai 
(forthcoming in International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 2019, Vol 68, Issue 2) 
ABSTRACT 
This paper responds to the widespread view that existing WTO rules are insufficient in dealing 
with China’s state capitalism, which has been further emboldened by its latest rounds of state-
owned enterprise (“SOE”) reforms. Through a careful review of WTO agreements and 
jurisprudence, the paper argues that, we do not necessarily need new rules, because the unique 
challenges created by China’s state capitalism can be sufficiently dealt with by the WTO’s 
existing rules on subsidies coupled with the China-specific obligations. Thus, a more realistic 
approach would be to push China back to the path of market-oriented reforms through WTO 
litigation based on existing rules, rather than trying to negotiate new rules. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
State-owned enterprises (“SOEs”) is now a looming challenge to the international 
economic legal order. In December 2016, an OECD report called for governments to 
“identify and remedy gaps in the coverage of multilateral rules regarding trade distorting 
government and enterprises behaviour.” 1  At the 11th WTO Ministerial Conference in 
December 2017, the US, the EU and Japan expressed serious concerns about the impacts of 
SOEs’ activities on “the proper functioning of international trade” and called for new rules to 
ensure a global level playing field.2 
While state sectors remain significant in many countries,3 China has been at the center of 
academic and policy debates given its growing clout in global economy and the size and 
complexities of its state sector. Many of the contemporary challenges in international trade 
regulation have much to do with China’s state capitalism. These include, for example, the 
EU’s amendments of anti-dumping regulation to specifically address market distortions 
caused by state intervention,4 the US’s refusal to recognize China as a market economy,5 and 
the escalating US-China trade conflicts and tit-for-tat protectionist moves through retaliatory 
tariffs.6 
                                                 
1  See OECD, STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES AS GLOBAL COMPETITORS: A CHALLENGE OR AN 
OPPORTUNITY? 15 (2016). 
2  See OFF. OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, JOINT STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES, 
EUROPEAN UNION AND JAPAN AT MC11 (Dec. 2017), available at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-
offices/press-office/press-releases/2017/december/joint-statement-united-states (last visited Nov. 30, 
2018). 
3 See Sean Miner, Commitments on State-Owned Enterprises, in TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: 
AN ASSESSMENT 335, 338 (Cathleen Cimino-Isaacs & Jeffrey J. Schott eds., 2016). 
4 Regulation (EU) 2017/2321 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 
2017 Amending Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 on Protection against Dumped Imports from Countries 
not Members of the European Union and Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 on Protection against 
Subsidised Imports from Countries not Members of the European Union, Official Journal of the 
European Union, L338, 19 December 2017. 
5  U.S. DEP’T OF COM., CHINA’S STATUS AS A NON-MARKET ECONOMY, (A-570-053 
Investigation, Public Document E&C VI: MJH/TB, 2017), available at 
https://enforcement.trade.gov/download/prc-nme-status/prc-nme-review-final-103017.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 30, 2018). 
6 See Proclamation No. 9705, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,625 (Mar. 8, 2018); Proclamation No. 9704, 83 
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In this debate, the key question is whether the existing WTO rules are adequate to address 
the effects of the Chinese government’s intervention in the domestic market on trade and 
competition. In a speech on US trade policy priorities, US Trade Representative Robert 
Lighthizer called China’s state capitalism “[an unprecedented] threat to the world trading 
system” and criticized the inadequacies of the WTO rules in ensuring “that a market-based 
economy prevails.”7 This view was repeated by US Ambassador to the WTO Dennis Shea, 
who argued at the General Council meeting on 26 July 2018 that “change is necessary if the 
WTO is to remain relevant to the international trading system”, but “the WTO itself does not 
currently provide the tools needed to bring about that change”. 8  This view is becoming 
increasingly popular in the international trade community, which not only regards the current 
set of multilateral rules as insufficient in dealing with China, but also deems it as a systemic 
failure of the WTO.9            
Are WTO rules indeed premised on market economy principles? Does WTO Membership 
really presume the existence of a market economy? These are important questions on both the 
letter and spirit of WTO rules and may only be adequately addressed by a separate article. 
Here, we would only note that while we do not entirely agree with either proposition, we do 
concede that certain WTO rules are more aligned with market economy principles and if used 
well, could help “build” a market economy, if we were to paraphrase the critics.  
Against this background, this article provides fresh insights into the current debate by 
exploring the challenges that China’s SOE reform may pose to the world trading system and 
how the WTO rules may be utilised to overcome these challenges. Section II provides a 
detailed review of China’s current SOE reform commenced in 2013. It argues that the reform 
seems to have been designed (and implemented) to create national champions and to ensure 
that the market-based transformation of SOEs does not undermine the effective control of the 
government. While market liberalisation and market-oriented economic reforms continue to 
progress in China, the resurrection of state capitalism also presents new challenges for the 
multilateral trading system.  
Section III discusses the limitations of using GATT/WTO10 rules to tackle the various 
issues relating to SOEs especially in the context of China’s current SOE reform. Being 
                                                                                                                                                        
CHINESE PRODUCTS IN RESPONSE TO UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES (June 15, 2018), available at 
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/june/ustr-issues-tariffs-
chinese-products; MINISTRY COM. P.R.C., NOTICE ON THE IMPOSITION OF TARIFFS ON CERTAIN 
GOODS FROM THE US, (June 16, 2016), available at 
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ae/ai/201806/20180602756389.shtml (China) (last visited Nov. 30, 
2018). 
7 CENT. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD., U.S. TRADE POLICY PRIORITIES: ROBERT LIGHTHIZER, 
USTR, at 4, (Sep. 18, 2017), available at https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/publication/170918_U.S._Trade_Policy_Priorities_Robert_Lighthizer_transcript.pdf?kYkVT9
pyKE.PK.utw_u0QVoewnVi2j5L (last visited Nov. 30, 2018). 
8 U.S. AMBASSADOR DENNIS SHEA, CHINA’S TRADE-DISRUPTIVE ECONOMIC MODEL AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WTO (WTO General Council Meeting, July 26, 2018), available at 
https://geneva.usmission.gov/2018/07/27/55299/  (last visited Nov. 30, 2018). 
9  See How to Rescue the WTO?, THE ECON. July 19, 2018, available at 
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/07/19/how-to-rescue-the-
wto?fsrc=scn/tw/te/bl/ed/howtorescuethewtoworldtrade (last visited Nov. 30, 2018); Philip I. Levy, 
The Treatment of Chinese SOEs in China’s WTO Protocol of Accession 16 WORLD TRADE REV. 635 
(2017). 
10 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. This 
became one of the multilateral agreements under the WTO. See General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
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cognizant of the limitations of the market economy hypothesis, we argue that the WTO does 
not provide a comprehensive code of conduct to govern the anti-competitive behaviour of 
SOEs or even enterprises in general,11 but only restrains Member governments from using 
certain policy instruments to undermine the expected conditions of competition. Through an 
analysis of the GATT rules on (1) honouring tariff concessions by import monopolies, (2) 
non-discrimination requirement on state trading enterprises (“STEs”), (3) trade restrictions by 
STEs, (4) transparency, and (5) anti-dumping measures, we argue that the first three rules are 
limited in terms of the types of policy instruments and the scope of obligations. Furthermore, 
the transparency mechanisms have been ineffective in ensuring adequate notifications by 
WTO Members in general and in inducing China to provide sufficient information on SOEs. 
Finally, the WTO jurisprudence has developed in a way that gradually removes the flexibility 
in using anti-dumping to address market distortions caused by state intervention.      
Recognising the limitations of general WTO rules, WTO Members negotiated China-
specific rules to tackle China’s state capitalism. These are discussed in Section IV, which 
explores China’s WTO-plus obligations on subsidies, pricing, and commercial behaviours of 
SOEs. We argue that the WTO rules on subsidies and countervailing measures, coupled with 
these China-specific commitments, have provided sufficient tools for Members to use in 
dealing with China. Therefore, instead of trying to negotiate new rules, WTO Members 
should make more active use of these existing rules.   
II.  CHINA’S CURRENT SOE REFORM 
SOE reform has been one of the central elements of China’s landmark economic reforms 
launched in 1978-79.12 Prior to the commencement of the current round of reform in 2013, 
China’s SOE reform had undergone several phases with many significant accomplishments. 
These phases of reform, which have been well documented, witnessed the devolution of 
corporate power through increasing the operational autonomy of SOEs (1978-1986)13 and the 
managerial authority of SOEs (1987-1992), 14  the privatisation, corporatisation and 
                                                 
11 Aaditya Mattoo, Dealing with Monopolies and State Enterprises: WTO Rules for Goods and 
Services, 1 (WTO Staff Working Paper, No. TISD9801, 1997). 
12 Gregory Chow, Economic Reform and Growth in China, 5 ANNALS ECON. & FIN. 127 (2004). 
13 For a discussion of the achievements and issues in this stage of reform, see Yiping Huang, 
State-Owned Enterprises Reform, in CHINA: TWENTY YEARS OF ECONOMIC REFORM 95, 99-101 
(Ross Garnaut & Ligang Song eds., 2012); Qunhui Huang, How ‘New SOEs’ Come of Age: Four 
Decades of China’s SOE Reform, 13 CHINA ECON. 58, 60-66 (2018); WU JINGLIAN & MA 
GUOCHUAN, WHITHER CHINA?: RESTARTING THE REFORM AGENDA 120–134 (Xiaofeng Hua & 
Nancy Hearst trans., Oxford Univ. Press. 2016); Xiao Geng, Xiuke Yang & Anna Janus, State-Owned 
Enterprises in China: Reform Dynamics and Impacts, in CHINA’S NEW PLACE IN A WORLD IN CRISIS: 
ECONOMIC, GEOPOLITICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DIMENSIONS 155, 157 (Ross Garnaut, Ligang 
Song & Wing Thye Woo eds., 2009); Xin Li & Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard, SOE Reform in China: Past, 
Present and Future, 31 COPENHAGEN J. ASIAN STUD. 54, 56-57 (2013). 
14 For a discussion of the achievements and issues in this stage of reform, see JINGLIAN WU, 
DANGDAI ZHONGGUO JINGJI GAIGE JIAOCHENG (当代中国经济改革教程 ) [UNDERSTANDING 
CHINA’S ECONOMIC REFORM] 152–53, (Shanghai Far East Publishers, 2d ed., 2016); Huang, Four 
Decades of China’s SOE Reform, supra note 13, at 64-66; Huang, State-Owned Enterprises Reform, 
supra note 13, at 101–04; Daniel Ho & Angus Young, China’s Experience in Reforming Its State-
Owned Enterprises: Something new, Something old and Something Chinese?, 2 INT'L J. ECON., MGMT. 
& SOC. SCI. 84, 85 (2013); NICHOLAS R. LARDY, CHINA’S UNFINISHED ECONOMIC REVOLUTION 23-
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modernization of SOEs (1993-2002), 15  and finally, with the establishment of the State-
Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (“SASAC”) in March 2003, a 
significant shift to the preservation and expansion of state assets and the creation of “national 
champions” of large SOEs especially in strategic sectors.16 
Before the launch of the current SOE reform, SOEs have shrunk in the numbers of firms 
and employees, and the market shares in many sectors.17 However, they became even more 
significant and influential in the economy. For example, in 2013, the 110 central SOEs (under 
the supervision of the SASAC) held 38,423 subsidiaries (compared with 16,290 subsidiaries 
in 2005) and controlled a total of RMB 9.3 trillion state assets (compared with RMB 3.7 
trillion in 2005).18 The efforts to create “national champions” made remarkable achievements 
with 85 mainland Chinese companies (the majority are SOEs) made to the Fortune Global 
500 list of the world’s largest corporations in 2013, rising from six in 2003.19 Notably, all of 
the 11 Chinese companies on the top 100 list in 2013 were central SOEs. Furthermore, the 
assignment of multiple roles to the SASAC and its local branches further enhanced the role of 
government in the management and operation of SOEs and hence increased the likelihood of 
government intervention in their business activities. 20  In addition, the Party played an 
                                                 
15 For a discussion of the achievements and issues in this stage of reform, see Yingyi Qian & 
Jinglian Wu, China’s Transition to a Market Economy: How Far Across the River?, in HOW FAR 
ACROSS THE RIVER?: CHINESE POLICY REFORM AT THE MILLENNIUM 31, 35–8 (Nicholas C. Hope, 
Dennis Tao Yang & Mu Yang Li eds., 2003); Huang, Four Decades of China’s SOE Reform, supra 
note 13, at 66-70; NICHOLAS LARDY, MARKETS OVER MAO: THE RISE OF PRIVATE BUSINESS IN 
CHINA 45-48 (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ., 2014); OECD, State Owned Enterprises in China: 
Reviewing the Evidence, at 4-5, (OECD Working Group on Privatisation and Corporate Governance 
of State Owned Assets, Jan. 26, 2009), available at 
https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceofstate-ownedenterprises/42095493.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 30, 2018); OECD, OECD REVIEWS OF REGULATORY REFORM – CHINA: DEFINING THE 
BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE MARKET AND THE STATE 42–43 (2009), available at 
https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/42390089.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2018); WU & MA, 
supra note 13, 158–63. 
16 See Lardy, The Rise of Private Business in China, supra note 15, at 48–58; Li & Brodsgaard, 
supra note 13, at 57-58; Dong Zhang & Owen Freestone, China’s Unfinished State-Owned Enterprise 
Reforms, 2 ECON. ROUNDUP 77, 83-93 (2013); Geng et al, supra note 13, at 158–61; US–China Econ. 
& Security Rev. Commission, 2012 Report to Congress, at 48-51 (Nov. 2012), available at 
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/2012-Report-to-Congress.pdf (last visited Aug. 
1, 2018). 
17 Barry Naughton, The Current Wave of State Enterprise Reform in China: A Preliminary 
Appraisal, 12 ASIAN ECON. POL'Y REV. 282 (2017). 
18 For 2013 data, see ZHONGGUO GUOYOU ZICHAN JIANDU GUANLI NIANJIAN (中国国有资产
监督管理年鉴) [CHINA’S STATE-OWNED ASSETS SUPERVISION AND ADMINISTRATION YEARBOOK] 
687 (China Econ. Publishing House, 2014). For 2005 data, see ZHONGGUO GUOYOU ZICHAN JIANDU 
GUANLI NIANJIAN (中国国有资产监督管理年鉴) [CHINA’S STATE-OWNED ASSETS SUPERVISION 
AND ADMINISTRATION YEARBOOK] 597 (China Economic Publishing House, 2006). See also 
Naughton, supra note18, at 285–86. 
19 See THE FULL LIST OF FORTUNE 500 COMPANY 2003, available at 
http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500_archive/full/2003/ (last visited Nov. 30, 
2018); See THE FULL LIST OF 95 CHINESE COMPANY THAT MADE TO THE FORTUNE 500 2013, 
available at http://www.fortunechina.com/fortune500/c/2013-07/08/content_164367.htm (in Chinese) 
(last visited Nov. 30, 2018).  
20  For a detailed discussion of SASAC’s multiple roles, see Barry Naughton, Top-Down 
Control: SASAC and the Persistence of State Ownership in China, 1–21 (paper presented at the 
“China and the World Economy” conf., Leverhulme Cent. for Res. on Globalisation and Econ. Pol’y, 
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important role in SASAC-controlled entities, maintaining a high level of influence on their 
operation.21 These issues provoked robust debates, both internationally and domestically, 
over the needs and approaches to push forward the SOE reform.22 
The current phase of SOE reform was launched by the Third Plenum of the 18th Party 
Congress in November 2013, which adopted the Decision on Matters on Comprehensively 
Deepening Reform. 23  The Decision outlined the missions for furthering comprehensive 
economic reforms with an emphasis on the crucial importance of enabling the market to play 
a decisive role in allocation of resources, and of managing government intervention in a way 
that enhances fair competition. It reiterated the significance of pursuing a “modern enterprise 
system” through further severing regulatory and business functions, improving corporate 
management and governance, and exposing SOEs to market competition. The Decision 
contemplated several important initiatives including the classification of SOEs, the creation 
of state assets management entities, and the introduction of private ownership in industries or 
projects that were previously reserved for SOEs. At the same time, however, the Decision 
envisaged that the economic reforms will be carried out under the Party’s leadership which 
shall be strengthened and improved. To implement the Decision, the Central Committee of 
the Party and the State Council jointly issued the Guiding Opinions on Deepening the Reform 
of State-Owned Enterprises24 (“Guiding Opinions”) in August 2015, which was followed by 
the release of over 110 implementing regulatory instruments at the central level, and over 830 
at the local level.25 Since the implementation of the reform started only after the release of the 
Guiding Opinions, the actual outcomes and prospects of the reform are far from clear. The 
numerous policy documents complicated rather than clarified the tasks and process of the 
reform. The implementation has been fragmented due to inconsistent interpretation of the 
Guiding Opinions at different levels of government and by different responsible authorities. 
Overall, the reform seems to have proceeded in a way that seeks to ensure that the market-
based transformation of SOEs serves to create more powerful and competitive SOEs and does 
not undermine the effective control of the government. In this sense, the current reform is 
more likely to be an extension of the previous round which concentrated on protection of 
state assets and creation of national champions than one which pursues fundamental changes.        
A. Classification of SOEs 
                                                                                                                                                        
https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/gep/documents/conferences/2006/june2006conf/naughton-
june2006.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2018). 
21 See Lardy, The Rise of Private Business in China, supra note 15, at 51. 
22 See Zhang & Freestone, supra note 16, at 93. WORLD BANK & DEV. RES. CTR. OF THE ST. 
COUNCIL OF CHINA, P.R.C., CHINA 2030: BUILDING A MODERN, HARMONIOUS, AND CREATIVE 
SOCIETY 109–15 (2013). 
23  ZHONGGONG ZHONGYANG GUANYU QUANMIAN SHENHUA GAIGE RUOGAN ZHONGDA 
WENTI DE JUEDING (中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定) (Nov. 12, 2013), available 
at http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2013-11/15/content_2528179.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2018). 
24  ZHONGGONG ZHONGYANG, GUOWUYUAN GUANYU SHENHUA GUOYOU QIYE GAIGE DE 
ZHIDAO YIJIAN (中共中央、国务院关于深化国有企业改革的指导意见) (promulgated by Cent. 
Comm. of CPC & St. Council, (Zhong Fa [2015] No. 22) Aug. 24, 2015, effective Aug. 24, 2015) 
(Chinalawinfo) [hereinafter Guiding Opinions]. 
25 Liu Qingshan (刘青山), Guoqi Guozi Wunian Gaige Lueying (国企国资 5年改革掠影) [A 
Glimpse of the Five years Reform of State-owned Enterprises] 9 GUOZI BAOGAO (国资报告) [STATE-
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The first element of the current reform concerns the classification of SOEs into 
“Commercial SOEs” and “Public Welfare SOEs”.26 This classification is aimed at further 
integrating SOEs into market-based economic reforms and promoting both the commercial 
and social functions of SOEs. In general, Commercial SOEs are expected to operate 
independently in the market and continue to pursue corporatization and ownership 
diversification with majority private shareholding allowed (“General Commercial SOEs”). 
Their performance is evaluated against three key criteria including general financial 
indicators (e.g. revenue and profits), return on state assets investment, and the market 
competitiveness of these entities. A sub-category of Commercial SOEs involves those whose 
core business falls within industries or fields concerning national security and the lifeline of 
the national economy, or those which undertake projects or tasks designated by the State 
(“Special Commercial SOEs”). While these SOEs are also open to private capital and mixed 
ownership, the State must remain the controlling shareholder. In addition to the performance 
criteria applicable to General Commercial SOEs, Special Commercial SOEs are also required 
to contribute to implementation of national strategies, protection of national security, and 
development of strategic industries. Public Welfare SOEs, which exercise social functions 
and provide public goods and services, may remain wholly state-owned and may decide 
whether to pursue ownership diversification according to their individual circumstances. The 
performance evaluation of these SOEs hinges on factors that reflect their capacity to make 
social contributions such as cost control, quality of services, and efficiency. The 
classifications of SOEs are summarized in Diagram 1 below. 
 
Diagram 1: SOE Classifications 
 
 
According to the classifications, one may observe that General Commercial SOEs are most 
likely to operate as privately-owned enterprises (“POEs”). In contrast, Special Commercial 
SOEs and Public Welfare SOEs will largely remain under the control of the State and are 
likely to be shielded from market competition. In practice, the classification has been 
                                                 
26 See Guiding Opinions, supra note 24, Section 2. The implementing regulation for the SOE 
classification is the GUANYU GUOYOU QIYE GONGNENG JIEDING YU FENLEI DE ZHIDAO YIJIAN (关于
国有企业功能界定与分类的指导意见) [GUIDING OPINIONS ON THE FUNCTIONAL DEFINITION AND 
CLASSIFICATION OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES] (promulgated by State-Owned Assets Supervision 
Commission & Ministry of Fin. of the P.R.C & Nat’l Dev. Reform Commission, (Guozifayanjiu 
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implemented by the SASAC and its local branches. Due to the large number of local SASAC 
departments, 27  the reform has resulted in mixed results with uncertain and fragmented 
classifications.28 For instance, Shanghai SASAC, Chongqing SASAC, Shanxi SASAC have 
classified their SOEs into three groups, namely, competitive, functional, and public service.29 
In contrast, Sichuan SASAC has defined all its SOEs as commercial SOEs. 30  These 
inconsistent practices suggest that the categorization of SOEs, by itself, may not provide a 
clear guidance on whether an SOE is more market-oriented or policy-oriented or whether it 
operates and competes according to market forces. Accordingly, it is necessary to consider 
other elements of the reform or other features of SOEs in assessing the function and conduct 
of SOEs. 
B. Corporate Governance 
The second element focuses on furthering the corporatization and modernization of 
SOEs.31 The reform seeks to promote the restructuring of SOEs and group companies for 
public listing, ownership diversification, and regulation of shareholders’ conducts, as well as 
to enhance the decision-making role of boards of directors and the autonomy of management. 
Accordingly, this element can be further broken up into three key components, including 
corporate governance (which is discussed below), mixed ownership (which is discussed in 
sub-section C), and restructuring and reorganisation (which is discussed in sub-section D). 
The implementation regulation on corporate governance reform, released in April 2017, 
set the deadline for the corporatization of central SOEs by the end of 2017.32 It requires 
clarifications of the rights and responsibilities of all organs and individuals central to the 
corporate governance system of SOEs, including shareholders, boards of directors, 
management, boards of supervisors, the Party, and representatives of employees (Section 2). 
According to the OECD, over 80% of central SOEs have finalized the process of establishing 
                                                 
27 There are more than 300 local SASAC departments at provincial, municipal, county, and 
town levels. See Liy Qingshan (刘青山), Naxie Yijing Xiaoshi de Difang Guoziwei (那些已经“消失”
的地方国资委 ) [The ‘Disappeared’ Local State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission] 8 GUOZI BAOGAO (国资报告) [STATE-OWNED ASSETS REPORT] 44, 44 (2016). 
28 Paul Hubbard, ‘Fragmented Authoritarianism’ and State Ownership, EAST ASIA FORUM Q. 
(Jan. 23, 2017), available at 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/01/23/fragmented-authoritarianism-and-state-ownership/ (last 
visited Nov. 30, 2018). 
29 Yuan Shimeng (原诗萌), Difang Guoqi Fenlei Gaige Fenxi Baogao (地方国企分类改革分
析报告) [An Analysis of the Classification of Local State-Owned Enterprises] 12 GUOZI BAOGAO (国
资报告) [STATE-OWNED ASSETS REPORT] 71 (2016). 
30 GUANYU YINFA GUANYU SHENGSHU QIYE GONGNENG JIEDING YU FEILEI JIANGUAN DE 
ZHIDAO YIJIAN (SHIXING)> DE TONGZHI ) (关于印发《关于省属企业功能界定与分类监管的指导
意见（试行）》的通知) [NOTICE ON THE PRINTING AND DISTRIBUTING THE GUIDING OPINIONS ON 
THE CLASSIFICATIONS OF PROVINCIAL SOES (TRIAL IMPLEMENTATION)], promulgated by Sichuan 
State-Owned Assets Supervision Commission (No. 115) June 7, 2016, effective June 7, 2016), 
available at www.scgz.gov.cn/10000/10004/10201/2016/06/12/10006366.shtml (last visited Nov. 30, 
2018). 
31 See Guiding Opinions, supra note 24, Section 3. 
32 See GUOWUYUAN BANGONGTING GUANYU JINYIBU WANSHAN GUOYOU QIYE FAREN ZHILI 
JIEGOU DE ZHIDAO YIJIAN (国务院办公厅关于进一步完善国有企业法人治理结构的指导意见) 
[GUIDING OPINIONS ON FURTHER IMPROVING THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE OF STATE-
OWNED ENTERPRISES] (promulgated by Gen. Off. of the St. Council (Guo Ban Fa [2017] No. 36), Apr. 
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a board of directors, although “this is mainly happening at the lowest tiers of enterprise 
groups, not at the group level.”33 However, there is limited information on the progress of the 
other elements of the corporatization. The most significant is the uncertainty relating to how 
government intervention in business decision-making is to be effectively managed or avoided. 
Despite the broad coverage of the reform, the Guiding Opinions stresses that the Party will 
play a leadership role in SOEs by creating a representative committee in the enterprises 
(“Party Committee”). 34  The constitutions of SOEs shall specify the functions of Party 
Committee and the process for its senior members to undertake executive roles in the entities 
and for executives of the entities to undertake senior positions in the committee. In principle, 
the Party secretary of the committee shall also serve as the chairman of the board. In the past, 
the involvement of the Party in the corporate governance of SOEs was typically linked to the 
appointment of senior executives, which had already generated concerns about state 
intervention in the management and decision-making of SOEs. As Lin observed,  
In 53 central enterprises, the occupants of top positions, including the board chairman, 
CEOs, and party secretaries, are appointed and evaluated by the Central Organization 
Department of the Chinese Communist Party. This appointment practice predates the 
establishment of SASAC and persists until today.35 
Under the current reform, the role of the Party is enhanced through an explicit power to 
directly participate in the decision-making of the board beyond personnel appointments.36 In 
practice, the implementation of the Guiding Opinions has led to amendments to the articles of 
association of SOEs. By 2017, all 98 central SOEs have incorporated provisions on Party 
Committee into their articles of association.37 Over 30 HK-listed SOEs have established Party 
Committees through amendments of articles of association.38  For example, the amended 
Articles of Association of Datang International Power Generation Co., Ltd, a HK-listed 
central SOE, includes the following clauses: 
Article 10 In accordance with the requirements of the Constitution of the Communist 
Party of China, an organisation of the Communist Party of China shall be established and 
play the core leadership role, functioning as the political core of the Company, providing 
direction, managing the overall situation and ensuring implementation…  
Article 139 (Item 20) The opinions of the Party Committee shall be heard before the 
board of directors decides on material issues of the Company.39 
                                                 
33  See OECD, OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: CHINA 2017 44 (2017), available at 
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/oecd-economic-surveys-china-2017_eco_surveys-chn-2017-
en (last visited Aug. 1, 2018). 
34 See Guiding Opinions, supra note 24, Section 7. 
35 Li-Wen Lin, A Network Anatomy of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises, 16 WORLD TRADE 
REV. 583, 588 (2017). 
36 Jennifer Hughes, Communist Party Control Written into Law at China’s Big Companies, FIN. 
TIMES (Aug. 15, 2017), available at https://www.ft.com/content/a4b28218-80db-11e7-94e2-
c5b903247afd (last visited Nov. 30, 2018); Naughton, supra note 17, at 292. 
37 Wang Qianqian (王倩倩), Guowuyuan Guoziwei Dangwei Tuijin Zhongyang Qiye Dangjian 
Gongzuo Jishi (国务院国资委党委推进中央企业党建工作纪实 ) [SASAC Promotes the 
Establishment of Party Committee in Central SOEs] (Oct. 10, 2017), available at 
www.sasac.gov.cn/n2588030/n2588919/c7979758/content.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2018). 
38 Hughes, supra note 36; Naughton, supra note 17, at 292. 
39  See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION AND NOTICE OF EGM, 
DATANG INTERNATIONAL POWER GENERATION CO., LTD, (June 29, 2017), available at 
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Such clauses leave considerable room and flexibility for the Party to exert influence over the 
boards of directors, thereby creating a clear tension with the pursuit of corporatization and 
modern corporate governance. Thus, despite the classifications of SOEs, there remains the 
possibility that the commercial decisions of all types of SOEs will be affected by the Party. 
The possibility tends to be higher in Special Commercial SOEs and Public Welfare SOEs 
than in General Commercial SOEs which are expected to optimise commercial performance 
and competitiveness.    
C. Ownership Diversification   
The second component of corporatization and modernization is ownership 
diversification.40  On the one hand, it allows the injection of private capital in SOEs in various 
ways and the involvement of private investors in the restructuring and management of SOEs, 
and provides full protection of the property rights and interests of all shareholders. In 
sensitive sectors such as oil, natural gas, electricity, railway, telecommunications, resources, 
and public utilities, non-state capitals are only allowed limited access upon completing 
security reviews in accordance with relevant laws and regulations. In theory, the introduction 
of non-state interest in SOEs would contribute to the corporate governance reform as it 
introduces additional checks and balances and improves transparency in the decision-making 
of SOEs.41  In practice, the reform has led to the sale of either a majority (i.e. General 
Commercial SOEs) or minority interest (e.g. Special Commercial SOEs) in SOEs to private 
investors. A typical example of the former is the diversification of ownership in Yunnan 
Baiyao Holdings, a provincial SOE initially 100% owned by the Yunnan SASAC. The state 
interest was diluted to 50% with the injection of private capital by New Huadu Industrial 
Group in 2016, and then to 45% with the introduction of another private investor Yuyue 
Technology Development Co., Ltd. in 2017.42   
With respect to Special Commercial SOEs, the mixed ownership reform is restricted in a 
list of industries specified in the Opinions of the State Council on the Development of Mixed 
Ownership Economy by State-Owned Enterprises43 (“Mixed Ownership Reform Opinions”). 
These industries include, for example, important communication infrastructure, water supply 
and conservation, oil and gas, power, forest and strategic mineral resources, key public 
technology. In these industries, private capital participation is limited to certain activities 
while the State remains the sole or controlling shareholder. Thus, the State will own or 
effectively control the SOEs in those sectors. The mixed ownership reform of China United 
Network Communications Group Co., Ltd. (“China Unicom”), a central SOE, offers a good 
                                                 
40 See Guiding Opinions, supra note 24, Section 5.  
41 See OECD, OECD Economic Surveys, supra note 33, at 36. 
42  See YUNNAN BAIYAO: 2016 NIAN NIANDU BAOGAO (云南白药：2016 年年度报告 ) 
[YUNNAN BAIYAO GROUP CO LTD ANNUAL REPORT 2016] at 56 (Apr. 2017), available at 
www.yunnanbaiyao.com.cn/upload/files/1704/%E4%BA%91%E5%8D%97%E7%99%BD%E8%8D
%AF%EF%BC%9A2016%E5%B9%B4%E5%B9%B4%E5%BA%A6%E6%8A%A5%E5%91%8A.
PDF (last visited Nov. 30, 2018); YUNNAN BAIYAO: 2017 NIAN BANNIANDU BAOGAO ZHAIYAO (云
南白药：2017 年半年度报告摘要) [Yunnan Baiyao Group Co., Ltd. First Half Year 2017 Report 
Summary] at 3 (Aug. 24, 2017), available at 
www.yunnanbaiyao.com.cn/upload/files/1708/%E4%BA%91%E5%8D%97%E7%99%BD%E8%8D
%AF%EF%BC%9A2017%E5%B9%B4%E5%8D%8A%E5%B9%B4%E5%BA%A6%E6%8A%A5
%E5%91%8A%E6%91%98%E8%A6%81.PDF (last visited Nov. 30, 2018).  
43 GUOWUYUAN GUANYU GUOYOU QIYE FAZHAN HUNHE SUOYOUZHI JINGJI DE YIJIAN (国务
院关于国有企业发展混合所有制经济的意见) (promulgated by St. Council, (Guo Fa [2015] No. 54), 
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illustration of how the reform of Special Commercial SOEs may proceed. As one of the six 
candidates selected for pilot mixed ownership reform in 2016,44 China Unicom reduced its 
shareholding in China United Network Communications Co., Ltd. – a Shanghai-listed 
subsidiary company – from 62.74% to 36.67% in 2017.45  The other major shareholders 
include state-owned China Life Insurance Company (10.22%) and China Structural Reform 
Fund Co., Ltd. (6.11%), and private investors Tencent (5.18%), Baidu (3.30%), JD.com 
(2.36%), Alibaba (2.04%), Suning Commerce Group (1.88%), Kuang-Chi Group (1.88%), 
and Shenzhen Huaihai Ark Information Fund (1.88%). Thus, the reform maintained the 
majority state ownership (i.e. 53%) in the subsidiary SOE so as not to affect the State’s 
control over the entity.  
As far as Public Welfare SOEs are concerned, the Mixed Ownership Reform Opinions 
largely reproduces the relevant section of the Guiding Opinions and merely adds several 
examples of the industries and fields supplying public goods and services which include 
utilities (i.e. water, electricity, natural gas, heat), public transportation and infrastructure. In 
these sectors, ownership diversification is to be guided (e.g. not encouraged) according to the 
conditions of SOEs.    
The other important aspect of the mixed ownership reform pertains to the encouragement 
of investment of state capital in POEs with a focus on public services, advanced technology, 
ecological and environmental protection, and other strategic industries. Article 4(13) of the 
Mixed Ownership Reform Opinions further clarified that State-owned capital investment and 
operating companies (which are discussed in sub-section E below) should play a major role in 
such investment. While how the reform is to proceed on this front remains to be seen, it 
creates the potential for the State to influence the private sectors. As Naughton has observed, 
the reform “may actually encourage the extension of SOEs into competitive markets where 
they do not currently have a presence…[by] encouraging state capital to expand its 
investment in, and control of, private firms.”46    
D. Restructuring and Reorganisation   
The third component of corportisation and modernization involves the restructuring and 
reorganization of SOEs. The Guiding Opinions on Promoting the Restructuring and 
Reorganisation of Central SOEs47 (“Restructuring Opinions”), released by the State Council 
in 2016, set out three key objectives of the reform. The first is to enhance the capability of 
central SOEs in protecting and stabilizing sectors of national security, their control in sectors 
of critical importance to national economy, and their influence and leadership in strategic and 
                                                 
44 GUOJIA FAZHAN GAIGEWEI ZHAOKAI GUOYOU QIYE HUNHE SUOYOUZHI GAIGE SHIDIAN 
ZHUANTIHUI SOES (国家发展改革委召开国有企业混合所有制改革试点专题会) [NATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT AND REFORM COMMISSION PRESS CONFERENCE ON PILOT PROGRAMS OF MIXED-
OWNERSHIP REFORM] (Sep. 28, 2016), available at 
www.ndrc.gov.cn/xwzx/xwfb/201609/t20160930_821881.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2018). 
45 See ANNUAL REPORT OF CHINA UNICOM (HONG KONG) LIMITED (2016), at 20, available 
at  www.chinaunicom.com.hk/en/ir/reports/2016_20f.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2018). 
46 Barry Naughton, Restructuring and Reform: China 2016 in STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN CHINA: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR AUSTRALIA AND THE WORLD 69 (Reserve Bank of Australia eds., 2016), 
available at www.rba.gov.au/publications/confs/2016/pdf/rba-conference-volume-2016.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 30, 2018). 
47 GUOWUYUAN BANGONGTING GUANYU TUIDONG ZHONGYANG QIYE JIEGOU TIAOZHENG YU 
CHONGZHU DE ZHIDAO YIJIAN (国务院办公厅关于推动中央企业结构调整与重组的指导意见) 
(promulgated by Gen. Off. of the St. Council (Guo Ban Fa [2016] No.56), Jul. 17, 2016, effective Jul. 
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priority sectors such as high-end equipment manufacturing, information technology, 
biotechnology, aviation and aerospace, new energy, new materials, energy conservation and 
environment protection, etc. The strategic and priority sectors are consistent with those 
identified in China’s overarching guiding policies such as the 12th Five Year Plan (2010-
2015), the Made in China 2025 Action Plan, and the 13th Five Year Plan (2016-2020).48 The 
second goal is to improve efficiency and allocation of resources through mergers and 
acquisitions, institutional innovation and cooperation, reduction of overcapacity, and disposal 
of inefficient and non-performing assets. The third is to boost the growth and 
internationalization of the central SOEs. Overall, the reform is expected to establish a group 
of world-class multinational companies with innovative capacity and international 
competitiveness by 2020. Between January 2013 and 31 January 2018, 37 central SOEs have 
undergone restructuring through 19 horizontal or vertical mergers, as summarised in Table 1 
below. Typical examples of horizontal mergers include the mergers of two rival companies in 
selected industries, such as the railway equipment industry (i.e. the two largest railway 
equipment groups – China CNR Corporation Limited (“CNR”) and CSR Corporation Limited 
(“CSR”)) in 2015, the shipping industry (i.e. the two largest shipping groups – China Ocean 
Shipping (Group) Company and China Shipping Group) in 2016, and the nuclear energy 
industry (i.e. China Nuclear Engineering and Construction Corp. (“CNEC”) and China 
National Nuclear Corp. (“CNNC”)) in 2018. This last merger reduced the number of central 
SOEs to 97 and created “a new nuclear powerhouse with assets worth more than 600 billion 
yuan ($95.4 billion).”49 With respect to vertical mergers, one remarkable example is the 
merger between electricity producer China Guodian Corporation (“Guodian”) and coal 
producer Shenhua Group Corporation Limited (“Shenhua”) in 2017 to create “the world’s 
largest power company by capacity, with combined assets of 1.8 trillion yuan.” 50  While 
restructuring of SOEs has also been carried out at the local level, the reform seems to have 
prioritized mergers of central SOEs so far.51 Overall, the restructuring and reorganization of 
SOEs, at least at the central level, has clearly carried forward the efforts of the previous round 
of reform to create “national champions” in strategic industries.52 As the reform continues to 
                                                 
48 For the full text of these policy instruments, see GUOMIN JINGJI HE SHEHUI FAZHAN DI 
SHIERGE WUNIAN GUIHUA GANGYAO (国民经济和社会发展第十二个五年规划纲要) [THE 12TH 
FIVE-YEAR PLAN FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] 
(Mar. 6 2011), available at http://www.gov.cn/2011lh/content_1825838.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 
2018); GUOMIN JINGJI HE SHEHUI FAZHAN DI SHISANGE WUNIAN GUIHUA GANGYAO (国民经济和
社会发展第十三个五年规划纲要) [The 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development 
of the People’s Republic of China] (Mar. 17, 2016), available at http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-
03/17/content_5054992.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2018); ST. COUNCIL OF THE P.R.C, MADE IN CHINA 
2025 (May 8, 2015), available at http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-05/19/content_9784.htm 
(last visited Nov. 30, 2018). 
49  See Huang Kaixi, Deng Yucong & Denise, China Combines Two State-Owned Nuclear 
Firms Into Powerhouse, CAIXIN NEWS AGENCY (ONLINE) (Feb. 1, 2018), available at 
www.caixinglobal.com/2018-02-01/china-combines-two-state-owned-nuclear-firms-into-powerhouse-
101205786.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2018). 
50 Id. 
51 Wendy Leutert, State-Owned Enterprise Mergers: Will Less be More?, EUR. COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN REL. (Nov. 30, 2016), available at 
www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/china_state_owned_enterprise_mergers_under_xi_jinping7196 
(last visited Nov. 30, 2018). 
52  François Godement, Introduction, EUR. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Nov. 30, 2016), 
available at 
www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/china_state_owned_enterprise_mergers_under_xi_jinping7196 
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proceed in that direction, the tension between the growing concentration and influence of 
SOEs in pillar industries and the market-oriented reform of SOEs will intensify.    
Table 1: List of Central SOEs Mergers between January 2013 and January 201853 
NO. Year Central SOEs Outcome 
1 2018 CNNC & CNEC CNEC merged into CNNC as a 
subsidiary 
2 2017 Guodian & Shenhua Establishing a new company, China 
Energy Investment Corporation 
3 2017 Sinolight Corporation (Sinolight) & 
China National Arts and Crafts (Group) 
Corporation (CNACGC) & China Poly Group 
Corporation (Poly Group) 
Sinolight and CNACGC merged 
into Poly Group as a subsidiary  
4 2017 China National Machinery Industry Corporation 
(Sinomach) & China Hi-Tech Group Corporation 
Limited (China Hi-Tech) 
China Hi-Tech merged into 
Sinomach as a subsidiary 
5 2016 China Grain Reserves Corporation (Sinograin) & 
China National Cotton Reserves Corporation 
(National Cotton) 
National Cotton merged into 
Sinograin as a subsidiary 
6 2016 Baosteel Group Corporation (Baosteel) & Wuhan 
Iron and Steel (Group) Corporation (WISCO) 
Establishing a new company, China 
BaoWu Steel Group Corporation 
Limited 
7 2016 China National Building Materials Group 
Corporation (CNBM) & China National Materials 
Group Corporation Limited (Sinoma) 
Sinoma merged into CNBM as a 
subsidiary 
8 2016 China National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs 
Corporation (COFCO) & Chinatex Corporation 
Limited (Chinatex) 
Chinatex merged into COFCO as a 
subsidiary 
9 2016 China Travel Service (HK) Group Corporation 
(HKCTS) & China International Travel Service 
Group Corporation (CITS) 
CITS merged into HKCTS as a 
subsidiary 
10 2015 China Merchants Group Company Limited & 
Sinotrans and CSC Holdings, Corporation Limited 
(Sinotrans Group) 
Sinotrans Group merged into China 
Merchants Group  as a subsidiary 
11 2015 China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company 
(COSCO) & China Shipping (Group) Company 
(China Shipping) 
Establishing a new company, China 
COSCO Shipping Corporation 
Limited 
12 2015 China Minmetals Corporation (Minmetals) & 
China Metallurgical Group Corporation (MCC) 
MCC merged into Minmetals as a 
subsidiary 
13 2015 Nam Kwong (Group) Company Limited (Nam 
Kwong) & Zhuhai Zhen Rong Company (Zhen 
Rong) 
Zhen Rong merged into Nam 
Kwong as a subsidiary 
14 2015 CNR & CSR  Establishing a new company, China 
Railway Rolling Stock Corporation 
Limited 
15 2015 China Power Investment Corporation (CPI) & 
State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation 
Limited (SNPTC) 
Establishing a new company, State 
Power Investment Corporation 
Limited 
                                                 
53 All mergers are reported and updated on the official website of the SASAC, available at 
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16 2014 China Huafu Trade and Development Corporation 
(Huafu) & COFCO 
Huafu merged into COFCO as a 
subsidiary 
17 2013 China National Erzhong Group Corporation 
(Erzhong) & China National Machinery Industry 
Corporation (Sinomach) 
Erzhong merged into Sinomach as 
a subsidiary 
18 2013 China Grain and Logistics Corporation (China 
Grain) & COFCO 
China Grain merged into COFCO 
as a subsidiary 
19 2013 Caihong Group Corporation (Caihong) & China 
Electronics Technology Group Corporation 
(CETC) 
Caihong merged into CETC as a 
subsidiary 
 
E. State Asset Management System  
The fifth and final element concerns the improvement of the state-owned assets 
management system.54 This reform aims to transform the functions of state assets regulatory 
bodies (i.e. SASAC and its local branches) by shifting the focus of the supervision from 
enterprise to capital, defining the boundaries of the supervision, and clarifying their rights 
and responsibilities. The reform has resulted in the creation of two types of companies, 
namely, State Capital Investment Companies (“SCICs”) and State Capital Operation 
Companies (“SCOCs”), or collectively State Capital Investment and Operation Companies 
(“SCIOs”). They specialize in the management of state assets and operate within the 
authorities granted by the SASAC or its local branches. While the management of state assets 
will be guided by the market, it is also required to serve national strategies, industrial policies, 
and the capital needs of the most competitive SOEs. Thus, SCIOs are essentially subordinates 
of central or local SASACs and are expected to support national or provincial industrial 
policies and the development of strategic and emerging industries.55 By the end of 2017, there 
were 89 SCIOs established at the central and local levels.56 
The differences between SCICs and SCOCs are not clearly defined in the existing 
regulatory documents. However, the practice suggests that they may serve different functions. 
For example, China Chengtong Holdings Group Ltd. (“Chengtong”), a SCOC created in 2016, 
initiated the China Structural Reform Fund to participate in the reorganization of SOEs,57 
including the mixed ownership reform of China United Network Communications Limited as 
discussed above. In contrast, the China Reform Holdings Corp., a SCIC established around 
the same time as Chengtong, partnered with two banks and one investment fund to inject 
RMB200 billion into innovative technology and industrial upgrading projects.58 Accordingly, 
                                                 
54 See Guiding Opinions, supra note 24, Section 4. 
55 See Naughton, supra note 17, at 291–2. 
56 See Wang Lu (王璐), Guozi Touzi Yunying Gongsi Shidian Gengduo Kuowei zhi Chongfen 
Jingzheng Hangye (国资投资、运营公司试点 更多扩围至充分竞争行业) [The Pilots for State 
Capital Investment and Operations Companies Expanded to Fully Competitive Industries], ECON. 
INFO. DAILY (ONLINE) (Mar. 15, 2018), available at 
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2588025/n2588139/c8734772/content.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2018). 
57 Chang Lyu, Massive fund to help reform giant SOEs, CHINA DAILY (ONLINE) (Sep. 27, 2016), 
available at  www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2016-09/27/content_26904633.htm (last visited Nov. 
30, 2018). 
58 Matthew Miller, China to reform SOEs using investment firms, asset managers: Xinhua, 
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the future reform may witness the division of labour between SCOCs and SCICs, with the 
former focusing on the restructuring of SOEs and the latter on the investment in priority 
industries.59 More significant than the possible functional difference between SCOCs and 
SCICs is the common goal that SCIOs serve and their far-reaching impacts on the SOE 
reform. As indicated in Table 1 above, SCIOs have been established through mergers of large 
SOEs to create massive fund to finance SOEs’ reorganization or investment in strategic 
industries. These reforms will considerably strengthen and expand the influence of SOEs or 
the State in these industries and generate growing concerns on China’s state capitalism. 
F. China’s State Capitalism as a Challenge for the World Trading System  
In essence, “state capitalism” concerns the magnitude of government involvement in 
business activities depending on “state ownership stake in or significant influence over” the 
business sector.60 While it takes different forms in different economies,61 one of the common 
features pertains to the extensive role that SOEs have been playing in consolidating and 
expanding state capitalism. 
China’s current SOE reform has been dedicated to bolstering the state sector and 
reinforcing the role of the State/Party in pursuing various policy objectives. As such, the 
reform is heading in a direction which strengthens rather than weakens state capitalism. In 
2017, the number of mainland Chinese companies on the Fortune Global 500 list of the 
world’s largest corporations increased to 109 (from 85 in 2013) including 48 central SOEs 
and 18 local SOEs.62  The restructuring of central SOEs has made some of the world’s largest 
companies even more powerful. For example, China BaoWu Steel Group Corporation 
Limited, the new company created through the merger between Baosteel and WISCO in 
September 2016, was ranked 204th in 2017, up from Baosteel’s ranking of 275th in 2016.63 
                                                                                                                                                        
visited Nov. 30, 2018); Engen Tham & David Stanway, China launches $30 bln state-controlled 
venture capital fund, TOMSON REUTERS (ONLINE) (Aug. 18 2016) available at 
www.reuters.com/article/china-funds/china-launches-30-bln-state-controlled-venture-capital-fund-
idUSL3N1AZ1SX (last visited Nov. 30, 2018). 
59 GUOYOU ZICHAN JIANGUAN HE GUOYOU QIYE GAIGE YANJIU BAOGAO (2014-2015) (国有
资产监管和国有企业改革研究报告  (2014-2015)) [REPORTS ON THE SUPERVISION OF STATED-
OWNED ASSETS AND THE REFORM OF STATED-OWNED ENTERPRISES (2014-2015)] 65 (China 
Economic Publishing House, 2017); Deloitte, Key Points on the Reorganization/Establishment of 
State-owned Capital Investment Companies and State-owned Capital Operating Companies (2016), 
available at www2.deloitte.com/cn/en/pages/operations/articles/soe-transformation-whitepaper-
issue5.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2018). 
60  JOSHUA KURLANTZICK, STATE CAPITALISM: HOW THE RETURN OF STATISM IS 
TRANSFORMING THE WORLD 13–14 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2016); Aldo Musacchio & Sergio G. 
Lazzarini, Leviathan in Business: Varieties of State Capitalism and their Implications for Economic 
Performance, 3–4 (Harv. Bus. Sch. Working Paper, Paper No.12–108, 2012), available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2070942 (last visited Nov. 30, 2018).  
61 See Kurlantzick, supra note 60, at 29–47.  
62 See FULL LIST OF FORTUNE 500 COMPANY 2017, available at 
http://fortune.com/fortune500/list/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2018); THE LIST OF ALL THE CHINESE 
COMPANIES THAT MADE INTO FORTUNE 500 COMPANY 2017, available at 
http://www.fortunechina.com/fortune500/c/2017-07/20/content_286799.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 
2018). 
63  See FULL LIST OF FORTUNE 500 COMPANY 2016, available at 
http://fortune.com/global500/2016/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2018); LIST OF ALL THE CHINESE 
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Similarly, Minmetals’ ranking rose from 323th in 2016 to 120th in 2017 after the 
reorganization with MCC in December 2015. In short, despite the rapid growth of the private 
sector and the progressive liberalisation in China, SOEs will remain one of the principal 
mechanisms of Chinese state capitalism for the foreseeable future.64  
The control of SOEs by the State/Party is not necessarily problematic, at least not under 
the rules of the WTO, as we argue below. However, combined with other factors, such 
control could and often did result in anti-competitive effects. As noted by a recent OECD 
report, the main concern is that SOEs “may not behave like private firms” and “decisions 
may not be driven by business objectives and the underlying creation of economic value” but 
“by political or public policy goals.”65 The report identifies a range of unfair competitive 
advantages to SOEs, spanning from subsidies and preferential financing to privileged access 
to information, regulatory advantages, protected monopolistic position, and other forms of 
government support.66 These problems are further exacerbated by China’s unique economic 
model whereby SOEs are regarded as the primary economic agents of the State and the main 
instrument for implementing industrial and other national policies.67 Frequently, large SOEs 
which are already market leaders individually are merged by the State to create behemoth 
national champions, in total disregard of antitrust concerns.68 While such mergers are often 
motivated by national pride rather than the desire for market dominance, the other firms in 
the same sectors often become collateral damages in such ambitious campaigns. In addition 
to squeezing competitors out of the relevant Chinese market, SOEs have also been used as a 
vehicle to restrict market access to China by foreign competitors 69  and expand foreign 
markets through aggressive bids and other means, often with the financial backing of the 
Chinese government.70 Moreover, State/Party controls not only create such anti-competitive 
effects, but tend to sustain such effects by preventing markets from self-correction through 
the confluence of several factors such as vertical policy actions, administrative monopoly, 
and preferential support for SOEs.71 Accordingly, these practices not only raise competition 
concerns in general, but also pose mounting challenges for the multilateral trading system as 
they undermine the conditions of competition that the WTO is designed to maintain. 
                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.fortunechina.com/fortune500/c/2016-07/20/content_266975.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 
2018). 
64  Benjamin Liebman & Curtis Milhaupt, Introduction: The Institutional Implications of 
China's Economic Development, in REGULATING THE VISIBLE HAND? THE INSTITUTIONAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE STATE CAPITALISM xiii, xv (Benjamin Liebman & Curtis Milhaupt eds., 
2016). 
65 See OECD, State-Owned Enterprises as Global Competitors, supra note Error! Bookmark 
not defined., at 27. 
66 Id., at 28–30. 
67 William E. Kovacic, Competition Policy and State-Owned Enterprises in China, 16 World 
Trade Rev., 693–711, 704 (2017). 
68 See Lin, A Network Anatomy of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises, supra note 35, at 587. 
69  See Peter Harrell, Elizabeth Rosenberg & Edoardo Saravalle, China’s Use of Coercive 
Economic Measures, Ctr. New Am. Sec. (June 2018), at 22, available at 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/China_Use_FINAL-
1.pdf?mtime=20180604161240 (last visited Nov. 30, 2018). 
70 See e.g. Kanupriya Kapoor & Hidayat Setiaji, Indonesia favouring China over Japan in 
railway bid - govt sources, Thomson Reuters (online) (Aug 31, 2015), available at 
https://www.reuters.com/article/indonesia-infrastructure-idUSL4N1162WK20150831 (last visited 
Nov. 30, 2018). Also see Angela Huyue Zhang, The Antitrust Paradox of China, Inc., 50 N.Y.U. J. 
Int'l L. & Pol. 159, 166 (2017).  
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Therefore, they put to the test the adequacy and efficacy of WTO rules in coping with 
Chinese state capitalism. 
III.  THE LIMITATIONS OF GATT/WTO RULES IN CHALLENGING STATE CAPITALISM 
The postwar effort to construct a multilateral system of world trade culminated in the 
conclusion of the GATT in October 1947 which subsequently operated as a de facto 
international institution for the negotiations of trade liberalization and the settlement of trade 
disputes over the decades before the birth of the WTO in 1994.72 Many GATT rules were 
designed to control and reduce the degree of governmental interference with commercial 
transactions so as to achieve a better allocation of international resources and increase the 
economic welfare worldwide.73 More specifically, these rules impose a series of general 
disciplines to limit the governments’ use of various policy instruments such as tariffs, 
quantitative restrictions, certain customs rules and formalities, internal taxes and regulations, 
and subsidies. However, these rules are ill-equipped to deal with SOEs, as noted by Jackson, 
Davey and Sykes below: 
Many GATT rules … restrict the types of regulations which governments can impose on 
international traders, but do not purport to regulate the traders themselves. If the 
government is the trader or controls the trader, the rules may be ineffective since 
decisions ostensibly made independently by the trader may in fact reflect actions of the 
government.74 
Indeed, GATT draftsmen realized that governments may act through firms or enterprises to 
influence trade indirectly.75 Thus, several GATT provisions seek to regulate such conduct by 
prohibiting the imposition of import mark-ups by import monopolies (Article II:4) and import 
or export restrictions through state trading operations (the interpretative note to Articles XI, 
XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII), and discriminatory conduct of STEs.  
Furthermore, subsidies, as a typical form of state intervention, may be used to enhance the 
international trading position of domestic firms in the pursuit of certain policy goals such as 
discouraging imports or promoting exports.76 The GATT treats subsidies as trade-distortive 
instruments, regulates the provision of subsidies, and allows the use of countervailing 
measures to offset the effect of subsidies. Subsidies are regulated under the WTO Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures77 (“SCM Agreement”), which elaborates on the 
relevant rules under GATT Articles VI (i.e. countervailing measures) and XVI (i.e. subsidies). 
In addition, GATT Article VI and the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement78 (“AD Agreement”) 
allow WTO Members to take actions against ‘dumping’, the practice of companies selling 
goods in a foreign market at a price (i.e. export price) lower than what the goods are sold in 
the market of exportation (i.e. normal value). Anti-dumping (“AD”), typically in the form of 
                                                 
72  The negotiation of the GATT was intertwined with the negotiation of a Charter for an 
International Trade Organisation (ITO) which failed to eventuate. For the drafting history of the ITO 
Charter and the GATT, see JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF THE GATT 35–46 
(1969). 
73 Id., at 329. 
74  JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J. DAVEY & ALAN O. SYKES, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS – CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 402 (4th ed., 2002). 
75 Jackson, World Trade and the Law of the GATT, supra note 72, at 331.  
76 Id., at 365. 
77 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 UNTS 14. 
78 Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
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import tariffs, has become one of the most popular instruments for countries to tackle the so-
called “unfair trade practice” which is made possible sometimes by state intervention in the 
market.  
Another reason for the limitations of the GATT rules in addressing state intervention in 
commercial activities has to do with the fact that the GATT was negotiated predominantly 
among market oriented economies without much contemplation of rules that apply to the so-
called non-market economies (“NMEs”). 79  Therefore, in economies where SOEs play a 
significant role or state intervention is pervasive in economic activities, the GATT rules tend 
to be insufficient to ensure that such economies operate in a way that does not nullify and 
impair the benefits of these rules.80 In 1950s-60s, the accession of certain NMEs (e.g. Poland, 
Romania, and Hungary) to the GATT led to the creation of a special AD rule to address 
certain extreme situations in which markets were dominated by state monopolies (which will 
be discussed in Section III.E).81 However, as these NMEs were “relatively small in terms of 
their impact on trade”,82 the limits of the GATT rules in addressing NME-related problems 
did not escalate into a systemic issue until the negotiations of China’s accession to the 
GATT/WTO. During the accession negotiations between 1986 and 2001, the Chinese 
economy underwent unprecedented and far-reaching market-oriented reforms and 
liberalization.83 The fact that China was no longer a purely centrally-controlled economy84 
largely rendered the above-mentioned special AD rule inapplicable. However, as China 
remained in the process of transitioning into a market economy at the time of the accession 
negotiations, GATT/WTO Members were concerned about the ineffectiveness of the general 
rules in dealing with China.85 Consequently, China agreed to undertake a range of WTO-plus 
obligations under its accession instruments – the Protocol on the Accession of China86 (“AP”) 
and the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China87 (“WPR”).  
The reminder of the article discusses the extent to which the general WTO rules and the 
China-specific WTO-plus obligations may be applied to Chinese state capitalism, particularly 
                                                 
79 See John Jackson, State Trading and Non-Market Economies 23 INT’L LAW. 891, 891–93 
(1989). 
80 See Eliza Patterson, Improving GATT Rules for Nonmarket Economies, 20 J. WORLD TRADE 
185, 186 (1986); William Davey, Article XVII GATT: An Overview, in STATE TRADING IN THE 
TWENTY–FIRST CENTURY 17, 32 (Thomas Cottier & Petros Mavroidis eds., 1998).  
81  GATT Analytical Index, Article VI Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties, at 228, 
available at www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/gatt_ai_e/art6_e.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2018). 
82 Jackson, State Trading and Non-market Economies, supra note 79, at 894. 
83  See NICHOLAS LARDY, INTEGRATING CHINA INTO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 65–105 
(Brookings Inst. Press, 2002). 
84 This was acknowledged by the GATT Secretariat and the founding Director General of the 
WTO. See e.g., GATT Secretariat, Working Party on China’s Status as A Contracting Party: China’s 
Foreign Trade Regime, GATT Doc. Spec(88)13/Add.13 (Sep. 7, 1993); GATT, Global Multilateral 
Trading System: The Role of the PRC, Address by Peter D. Sutherland, GATT Doc. GATT/1633 
(May 10, 1994). 
85 See e.g., GATT, Working Party on China, GATT Doc. GATT/AIR/2392 (Mar. 11 1987); 
GATT, Working Party on China Status as a Contracting Party, GATT Doc. L/6191/Rev.1 (Feb. 25 
1988); GATT Secretariat, Working Party on China’s Status as A Contracting Party: Annotated 
Checklist of Issues, GATT Doc. Spec(88)13/Add.5 (June 9, 1989); WTO, Communication from China, 
WTO Doc. WT/ACC/CHN/15 (Jul. 13, 1998); WTO, Communication from China, WTO Doc. 
WT/ACC/CHN/30 (July 18, 2000). 
86 Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432 (23 November 
2001). [hereinafter AP] 
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in the context of China’s current SOE reform. Due to space constraints, our discussions will 
focus on the rules relating to trade in goods as opposed to trade in services.88  
A. Non-Discrimination and STEs 
The non-discrimination principle, enshrined in the most-favoured-nation (“MFN”) rule 
(GATT Article I:1) and the national treatment (“NT”) rule (GATT Article III), is one of the 
fundamental pillars of the WTO edifice. Activities of government-related enterprises may 
undermine the operation of these rules through business decisions which discriminate among 
imports or between imported and domestic goods based on origin. Accordingly, one of the 
key proposals during the negotiations of the GATT was the imposition of an obligation on 
governments to ensure that STEs “operate on a non-discriminatory basis, allowing their sales 
and purchases to be governed only by commercial considerations.”89 This obligation was 
eventually codified in GATT Article XVII:1 which reads in the substantive parts: 
(a) Each contracting party undertakes that if it establishes or maintains a State enterprise, 
wherever located, or grants to any enterprise, formally or in effect, exclusive or 
special privileges, such enterprise shall, in its purchases or sales involving either 
imports or exports, act in a manner consistent with the general principles of non-
discriminatory treatment prescribed in this Agreement for governmental measures 
affecting imports or exports by private traders.  
(b) The provisions of sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph shall be understood to require 
that such enterprises shall, having due regard to the other provisions of this 
Agreement, make any such purchases or sales solely in accordance with commercial 
considerations, including price, quality, availability, marketability, transportation and 
other conditions of purchase or sale, and shall afford the enterprises of the other 
contracting parties adequate opportunity, in accordance with customary business 
practice, to compete for participation in such purchases or sales. 
Two major elements may affect the scope of Article XVII:1 in dealing with SOEs, including 
the enterprises covered and the obligations imposed.  
Article XVII:1 deals with “STEs” which is defined under Article 1 of the Understanding 
on the Interpretation of Article XVII (“Understanding”) as follows: 
Governmental and non-governmental enterprises, including marketing boards, which 
have been granted exclusive or special rights or privileges, including statutory or 
constitutional powers, in the exercise of which they influence through their purchases or 
sales the level or direction of imports or exports.   
This definition leaves two major issues unclarified: (1) the scope of “exclusive or special 
rights or privileges”, and (2) the degree of influence required to become an STE. These two 
issues are arguably at the core of determining whether an enterprise is subject to the 
obligations under Article XVII:1. Since it is impossible to envisage all trade-distorting 
activities of STEs, Article XVII:1 seeks to tackle the underlying sources of such trade 
distortions, namely, the use of special rights and privileges by an enterprise to influence 
trade.90 Without limiting the scope of “exclusive or special rights or privileges”91 or requiring 
                                                 
88 For a discussion of the adequacy of WTO rules on trade in services in dealing with state 
enterprises and monopolies, see Mattoo, supra note 11. 
89 Jackson, World Trade and the Law of the GATT, supra note 72, at 331.  
90 See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, GATT Law on State Trading Enterprises: Critical Evaluation 
of Article XVII and Proposals for Reform, in STATE TRADING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 71, 72 
(Thomas Cottier & Petros Mavroidis eds., 1988). 
91 The only limits on the scope of ‘exclusive or special rights or privileges’ are set out in the 
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any specific degree of influence, Article XVII:1 provides the flexibility to cover a broad 
range of enterprises including SOEs and private firms which utilise special rights or 
privileges bestowed by governments to influence trade through “purchases or sales” activities. 
In this connection, the Working Party on STEs, established under Article 5 of the 
Understanding, produced an illustrative list on notifiable STEs.92 While the list did not define 
STEs, it contemplated a wide spectrum of government-entity relationships and activities of 
enterprises, showing the willingness of WTO Members to maintain a flexible definition of 
STEs.93  Accordingly, in the context of China’s SOE reform, Public Welfare SOEs and 
Special Commercial SOEs would fall within the definition of STEs as they undertake 
governmental functions or carry out government-mandated policies either explicitly or 
implicitly. Article XVII:1 could also be applied to General Commercial SOEs or private 
enterprises insofar as special rights or privileges are conferred on these entities, enabling 
them to influence trade through “purchases or sales” or associated activities.94    
In contrast with the potentially broad coverage of STEs, the substantive obligations 
imposed by Article XVII:1(a) and (b) are limited. According to Professor Jackson, these 
provisions were intended to impose an MFN obligation only.95 However, the issue whether 
Article XVII:1(a) also covers an NT obligation remains unsettled to date.96  In Canada – 
FIRA, the GATT panel concurred with Canada’s submission that only the MFN and not the 
NT obligations fall within the scope of Article XVII:1(a).97 In contrast, the WTO panel, 
subsequently in Korea – Beef, observed that the general principle of non-discrimination under 
                                                                                                                                                        
standards of quality and efficiency in the operation of external trade, or privileges granted for the 
exploitation of national natural resources but which do not empower the government to exercise 
control over the trading activities of the enterprise in question.” These limits were compromises 
reached in the original negotiations of the GATT. See Jackson, World Trade and the Law of the GATT, 
supra note 72, at 341–42.  
92 WTO, Working Party on State Trading Enterprises, Illustrative List of Relationships between 
Governments and State Trading Enterprises and the Kinds of Activities Engaged in by These 
Enterprises, WTO Doc. G/STR/4 (July 30, 1999). 
93 Andrea Mastromatteo, WTO and SOEs: Article XVII and Related Provisions of the GATT 
1994, 16 WORLD TRADE REV. 601, 607 (2017). 
94 With respect to the activities of enterprises, while Article XVII:1(a) refers to “purchases or 
sales involving either imports or exports”, there is no requirement that the enterprises concerned 
undertake import or export activities; rather, it would suffice if their purchases or sales affect trade. 
Moreover, the Working Party on STEs provided a non-exhaustive list of activities ranging from direct 
involvement in importation or exportation (e.g. imports control, quota administration, licensing) to 
those relating to domestic sales or purchases (e.g. production, distribution, credit guarantees, storage, 
promotion, packaging, transportation). This suggests that the covered activities are not limited to 
‘purchases or sales’ per se but include related activities. See GATT, Panel on Subsidies and State 
Trading, Final Report on State Trading, at 5, GATT Doc. L/1146 (11 March 1960); Working Party on 
State Trading Enterprises, supra note 92. 
95 Jackson, World Trade and the Law of the GATT, supra note 72, at 345-47.  
96 For a review of the relevant GATT/WTO panels’ decisions, see Petersmann, supra note 90, 
at 80–84; Mastromatteo, supra note 93, at 608–09. 
97 GATT Panel Report, Canada—Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, para. 
5.16, GATT Doc. L/5504–30s/140 (adopted Feb. 7, 1984) [hereinafter Canada—FIRA]. Canada’s 
submission relied on two major arguments: (1) the reason why the word ‘principle’ is used in the 
plural is that the GATT contains a number of MFN-type obligations; and (2) by referring to ‘imports 
or exports’, Article XVII:1(a) does not concern “the treatment by the state-trading enterprise of 
imported or domestic products in its domestic market.” The validity of these arguments has not been 
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Article XVII:1(a) “includes at least the provisions of Articles I and III of GATT.”98  In 
Canada – Wheat, the Appellate Body (“AB”) was requested to consider the relationship 
between paragraphs (a) and (b) of Article XVII:1 and did not clarify the exact scope of the 
non-discrimination principles under Article XVII:1(a).99 
Another important issue is whether Article XVII:1(b) establishes a stand-alone obligation 
beyond non-discrimination, that is, requiring STEs to “make … purchases or sales solely in 
accordance with commercial considerations” (“Commercial Considerations Requirement”) 
and “afford the enterprises of the other contracting parties adequate opportunity … to 
compete for participation in such purchases or sales” (“Adequate Opportunity Requirement”). 
In Canada – Wheat, one of the US’s major claims was that the Commercial Considerations 
Requirement is additional to non-discrimination so that STEs must “make sales solely in 
accordance with commercial considerations”.100 The AB disagreed, holding that the opening 
phrase of Article XVII:1(b) shows “abundantly clear” that the remainder of that provision 
merely defines and clarifies the requirement in Article XVII:1(a) and does not create 
obligations separate or independent from non-discrimination. 101  The AB concluded that 
“Article XVII:1 was intended to impose disciplines on one particular type of STE behaviour, 
namely discriminatory behaviour, rather than to constitute a comprehensive code of conduct 
for STEs” or impose “comprehensive competition-law-type obligations on STEs”. 102 
Regarding the Adequate Opportunity Requirement, the AB rejected the US’s allegation that 
this requirement means that “the CWB must offer the requisite opportunity to any enterprise 
that is … selling wheat in the same market as the CWB.”103 The reason was that the Adequate 
Opportunity Requirement “must refer to the opportunity to become the STE’s counterpart in 
the transaction, not to an opportunity to replace the STE as a participant in the transaction.”104  
In light of the above, while Article XVII:1 is sufficiently broad to capture SOEs, it is 
limited to anti-discrimination and does not address other trade-distorting conduct of SOEs. 
Other than discrimination, Article XVII:1 does not prohibit anti-competitive behaviour of 
SOEs and does not require SOEs to act as private entities, thereby leaving the flexibility for 
WTO Members to use SOEs for various regulatory purposes.105 Finally, the application of 
Article XVII:1 may be qualified by the availability of other WTO rules applicable to trade-
distorting conduct of SOEs. As the AB observed in Canada – Wheat, “Article XVII:1 was 
never intended to be the sole source of the disciplines imposed on STEs” and “a number of 
                                                 
98 Panel Report, Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, paras. 
753, 769, WTO Doc. WT/DS161/R, WT/DS169/R (adopted Jan. 10, 2001) [hereinafter Korea—Beef]. 
Amongst others, the panel found that the practice of Korea’s Livestock Products Marketing 
Organisation, in delaying “its sales of imported beef into the Korean market while having important 
stocks”, violated the non-discrimination principles contemplated in Article XVII:1(a). This finding 
suggests a NT-type violation whereby imported beef was treated less favourably than domestic beef in 
terms of distribution in the Korean market.  
99 Appellate Body Report, Canada—Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of 
Imported Grain, para. 88, WTO Doc. WT/DS276/AB/R (adopted Sep. 27, 2004) [hereinafter 
Canada—Wheat] 
100 Id., paras. 82–83. 
101 Id., paras. 89–91. 
102 Id., paras. 97–98, 145. 
103  Id., para. 152. CWB refers to Canadian Wheat Board the monopoly and STE at issue 
conferred with a range of “exclusive and special privileges” over the purchase and sale of wheat in 
certain areas.  
104 Id., para. 157 (original emphasis). 
105  Bernard Hoekman & Joel Trachtman, Canada-Wheat: Discrimination, Non-Commercial 
Considerations, and the Right to Regulate Through State Trading Enterprises 7 World Trade Rev. 45, 
58, 62, 64 (2008). 
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additional obligations, under different covered agreements, operate to further constrain the 
behaviour of STEs.”106 These obligations include, inter alia, GATT Article II:4, the Ad Note 
to Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII, and GATT Article VI as implemented by the SCM 
Agreement and the AD Agreement.107 In practice, GATT/WTO tribunals have relied on the 
other disciplines, in preference to Article XVII:1, in condemning the conduct of STEs.108    
B. Tariffs and Import Monopoly 
Another fundamental GATT/WTO rule, as codified in GATT Article II:1, serves to protect 
the value of tariff concessions by preventing a WTO Member from increasing import tariffs 
beyond the ‘bound’ levels recorded in its WTO ‘Schedules of Concessions on Goods’ 
(“Goods Schedule”). While this rule limits the permissible conduct of governments, it is not 
directly applicable to the activities of companies. Thus, if a trading company acquires a 
monopoly position in the importation of certain goods, it may simply make a business 
decision to increase their resale price in the domestic market, which would effectively offset 
the benefits of tariff concessions. To deal with such a situation, GATT Article II:4 stipulates:  
If any contracting party establishes, maintains or authorizes, formally or in effect, a 
monopoly of the importation of any product described in the appropriate Schedule 
annexed to this Agreement, such monopoly shall not, except as provided for in that 
Schedule or as otherwise agreed between the parties which initially negotiated the 
concession, operate so as to afford protection on the average in excess of the amount of 
protection provided for in that Schedule...       
Thus, Article II:4 limits the level of protection an import monopoly may provide for a 
‘bound’ product by requiring that the maximum permissible monopoly protection must not, 
on the average, exceed the amount of protection specified in Goods Schedules.109 The Ad 
Note to Article II:4 suggests that the relevant provisions of Article 31 of the Havana Charter 
would assist in the interpretation of this obligation. Article 31(4) of the Havana Charter 
relevantly provides that a ‘bound’ import duty 
shall represent the maximum margin by which the price charged by the import monopoly 
for the imported product (exclusive of internal taxes conforming to the provisions of 
Article 18 [i.e. GATT Article III], transportation, distribution and other expenses incident 
to the purchase, sale or further processing, and a reasonable margin of profit) may exceed 
the landed cost...110 
Accordingly, several GATT panels interpreted Article II:4 as allowing only for protection 
that has been included in Goods Schedules. In Canada – Provincial Liquor Boards (EEC), 
since all imported alcoholic beverages are bound under Canada’s Goods Schedule, the panel 
ruled that the application of a higher profit margin on imported alcoholic beverages than that 
on like domestic ones ran afoul of Article II:4.111 The panel held that an import monopoly 
may charge, beyond an import duty, costs associated with importation and a “reasonable 
                                                 
106 Appellate Body Report, Canada—Wheat, supra note 99, para. 98. 
107 Id., para. 98 & FN 102–05. 
108 See Mastromatteo, supra note 93, at 609. 
109 Jackson, World Trade and the Law of the GATT, supra note 72, at 356-57.  
110  GATT Analytical Index, Article II Schedules of Concessions, at 91–92, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/ai17_e/gatt1994_art2_gatt47.pdf  (last visited Nov. 
30, 2018). 
111  GATT Panel Report, Import, Distribution and Sale of Alcoholic Drinks by Canadian 
Provincial Marketing Agencies, paras. 4.3–19, GATT Doc. L/6304-35S/37, (adopted 22 Mar. 22, 
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amount of profit”.112 However, a profit margin obtained from a monopoly position – i.e. not 
under normal conditions of competition – is not ‘reasonable’ and would constitute a ‘mark-up’ 
prohibited by Article II:4.113 Regarding the costs associated with importation, the panel in 
Canada – Provincial Liquor Boards (US) clarified that they must reflect the variable costs 
directly associated with the importation of the goods or the “charges for fixed assets 
employed that were calculated in proportion to the use of these assets by the imported 
product.” 114  Accordingly, the panel found that the cost-of-service differential between 
imported and domestic products, which was equivalent to the differential profit margin 
applied previously in Canada – Provincial Liquor Boards (EEC), did not represent 
“additional costs necessarily associated with the marketing of imported products”.115 To date, 
Article II:4 has not been considered by WTO tribunals, which suggests that import 
monopolies “are less of an issue nowadays” than they were during the GATT era.116 
The scope of Article II:4 in dealing with SOEs is limited in at least three aspects. Firstly, 
Article II:4 concerns whether an entity maintains a monopoly position in the importation of 
goods. Thus, SOEs that do not have such a monopoly position would fall outside the ambit of 
Article II:4. Secondly, Article II:4 regulates import tariffs only and does not deal with other 
types of policy instruments which may or may not be covered by other GATT/WTO rules. 
For example, Article II:4 does not apply to quantitative restrictions which are governed by 
GATT Article XI:1. Nor does Article II:4 apply to export tariffs which are generally excluded 
from GATT disciplines. Thirdly, Article II:4 applies to ‘bound’ goods only and does not 
apply to goods which are ‘unbound’ (i.e. not included in Goods Schedules), although the 
current coverage of bound tariff lines is broad.117   
C. Quantitative Restrictions and STEs 
Import or export quantitative restrictions (i.e. quotas), which are generally prohibited 
under GATT Article XI:1, may also be applied via STEs. Thus, the Ad Note to Articles XI, 
XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII stipulates that  
                                                 
112 Id, paras. 4.16, 4.19. The panel ruled that “‘a reasonable margin of profit’ was a margin of 
profit that would be obtained under normal conditions of competition (in the absence of the 
monopoly). The margin of profit would have on the average to be the same on both domestic and the 
like imported products so as not to undermine the value of tariff concessions under Article II.” With 
respect to costs associated with importation, the panel held that “the mark-ups which were higher on 
imported than on like domestic alcoholic beverages (differential mark-ups) could only be justified 
under Article II:4, to the extent that they represented additional costs necessarily associated with 
marketing of the imported products, and that calculations could be made on the basis of average costs 
over recent periods.” 
113 This finding was confirmed by the GATT panel in Korea – Beef (Australia). See GATT 
Panel Report, Republic of Korea—Restrictions on Imports of Beef—Complaint by Australia, para. 
106, GATT Doc. L/6504 – 36S/202, (adopted Nov. 7, 1989). 
114 GATT Panel Report, Canada—Import, Distribution and Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks by 
Provincial Marketing Agencies, paras. 5.19, GATT Doc. DS17/R-39S/27, (adopted 18 Feb. 18, 1992) 
[hereinafter Canada—Provincial Liquor Boards (US)]. 
115 Id., paras. 5.18, 5.21. 
116 1 PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE: GATT 172 (MIT 
Press. 2016). 
117 WTO, Six Decades of Multilateral Trade Cooperation: What Have We Learnt? in WORLD 
TRADE REPORT 2007 SIXTY YEARS OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM: ACHIEVEMENTS AND 
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Throughout Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII, the terms “import restrictions” or 
“export restrictions” include restrictions made effective through state-trading 
operations.118 
This Ad Note has been applied in a number of disputes to successfully challenge the conduct 
of STEs. For example, in Canada – Provincial Liquor Boards (EEC), the GATT panel found 
that “the practices concerning listing/delisting requirements and the availability of points of 
sale [as maintained by the Canadian import and distribution monopoly of alcoholic beverages] 
which discriminate against imported alcoholic beverages were restrictions made effective 
through state-trading operations contrary to Article XI:1.”119 The panel observed that such 
“systematic discriminatory practices” were “restrictions made effective through ‘other 
measures’ within the meaning of Article XI:1”.120 In Korea – Beef, the WTO panel clarified 
that in cases where an STE exercises effective controls over both importation and distribution 
channels, “the imposition of any restrictive measure, including internal measures, will have 
an adverse effect on the importation of the products concerned”; and this will trigger the 
application of the Ad Note.121 Consequently, the panel found that as the Livestock Products 
Marketing Organisation (Korea’s state trading agency for beef) had an exclusive import right 
over 30% of imported beef, its refusal to distribute imported beef in the domestic market 
constituted import restrictions on foreign beef contrary to Article XI:1 through the application 
of the Ad Note, amongst other WTO rules.122   
Given the definition of STEs, the scope of the Ad Note is not confined to import or export 
monopolies or STEs with exclusive rights over importation or exportation. However, like 
Articles XVII:1 and II:4, the Ad Note merely deals with one type of trade-restrictive policy 
instrument. The combined scope of these provisions is therefore limited as they leave other 
forms of trade-distorting measures unregulated. Finally, it must be noted that the Ad Note 
does not prohibit Members from using STEs for importation or exportation per se. As ruled 
by the WTO panel in India – Quantitative Restrictions, 
the mere fact that imports are effected through state trading enterprises would not in 
itself constitute a restriction. Rather, for a restriction to be found to exist, it should be 
shown that the operation of this state trading entity is such as to result in a restriction.123 
This suggests that to establish a violation of the Ad Note, the facts that ‘trading rights’ (i.e. 
the right to import or/and export) are granted to an entity with exclusive or special privileges 
(i.e. an STE) and that there are no imports of the subject goods during certain periods are not, 
in themselves, sufficient.124 One must further prove that the absence of imports is caused by 
the STE.    
                                                 
118 While Articles XII, XIV and XVIII provide for certain exceptions to the general principle 
above for balance of payments and economic development reasons, Article XIII requires that any 
permitted import or export quotas are allocated on a non-discriminatory basis. The latter means that 
administration of quotas through STEs in a discriminatory manner is also prohibited. 
119 GATT Panel Report, Canada—Provincial Liquor Boards (EEC), supra note 111, para. 4.25. 
120 Id., para. 4.24. 
121 WTO Panel Report, Korea—Beef, supra note 98, para. 751. The panel also observed that 
“when dealing with measures relating to agricultural products” (i.e. beef in this case), a violation of 
the Ad Note “would necessarily constitute a violation of” Article 4.2 of the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture and Footnote 1 to that provision which prevent Members from maintaining quantitative 
import restrictions through STEs. (paras. 759-62) 
122 Id., paras. 767–68.  
123 WTO Panel Report, India—Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural Textile and 
Industrial Products, para. 5.134, WTO Doc. WT/DS90/R (adopted on Sep. 22, 1999). 








As an underlying WTO principle, transparency serves to reduce “information asymmetries 
among governments, and between the State, economic actors, and citizens” and is essential 
for the systemic stability of the trading system.125  In general, the GATT/WTO rules on 
transparency comprise three key elements: (1) publication of trade-related laws, regulations 
and other governmental measures (e.g. GATT Article X), (2) notification of such regulatory 
measures under various WTO agreements through the relevant WTO committees, and (3) 
periodic review of trade policies and regulations pursuant to the Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism (“TPRM”). For various reasons, however, the implementation of these rules in 
practice has been uneven under the different notification mechanisms.126  
Transparency becomes more crucial for the operation of the trading system when dealing 
with NMEs or SOEs the impact of whose conducts on trade is often difficult to observe.127 
During the 1954-55 Review Session, GATT Article XVII:4 was added with an aim to 
ensuring adequate disclosure of the activities of STEs so as to bring STEs under closer 
international scrutiny. 128  Sub-paragraphs (a)-(c) of Article XVII:4, respectively, require 
Members to notify the products traded by STEs, the import mark-up applied by import 
monopolies, and the operations of STEs that have adversely impacted the interests of other 
Members. Sub-paragraph (d) excludes confidential information from the disclosure 
obligations. Subsequently, the GATT Contracting Parties adopted standard questionnaire and 
procedures for STE notifications in 1960 and 1962, which however did not facilitate adequate 
notifications. 129  The Understanding on Article XVII was then designed to improve the 
notifications by (1) requiring Members to review their policies regarding submission of STE 
notifications to the Council for Trade in Goods, (2) encouraging Members to maximize 
transparency on the notification of STE operations and the effect on trade, and (3) allowing 
other Members to make counter-notifications against inadequate notifications. The Working 
Party on STEs was tasked to review notifications and counter-notifications. In 2003, the 
Working Party produced a revised questionnaire requesting for a wide range of information 
on STEs, their activities, and impact on trade.130 Despite these efforts, notifications have 
remained strikingly inadequate with a decreasing number of notifications over the 
notification periods despite the expansion of the WTO membership. 131  In the latest 
notification period in 2016, only 45 new and full notifications were submitted, while 91 
Members including China did not submit a notification.132  
Under the TPRM, China’s Trade Policy Review (“TPR”) documents in 2016 did contain 
information on SOEs. However, the information provided by China was too sparse to satisfy 
                                                 
125 See generally Petros Mavroidis & Robert Wolfe, From Sunshine to a Common Agent: The 
Evolving Understanding of Transparency in the WTO, 21 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 118 (2015); Robert 
Wolfe, Letting the Sunshine in at the WTO: How Transparency Brings the Trading System to Life, 1–
44 (WTO, Staff Working Paper ERSD-2013-03, 2013).  
126 See Wolfe, Letting the Sunshine in at the WTO, supra note 125, at 16–19.  
127 See Patterson, supra note 80, at 199–200.  
128 Jackson, World Trade and the Law of the GATT, supra note 72, at 349-50.  
129 See GATT Analytical Index, Article VI Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties, supra 
note 81, at 481–82; Jackson, World Trade and the Law of the GATT, supra note 72, at 350–54. 
130 WTO Working Party on State Trading Enterprises, Questionnaire on State Trading, WTO 
Doc. G/STR/3/Rev.1 (Nov. 14, 2013).  
131 WTO Working Party on State Trading Enterprises, Status of Notifications Submitted by 
WTO Members under Article XVII:4(A) of the GATT 1994 and Paragraph 1 of the Understanding on 
the Interpretation of Article XVII of the GATT 1994, WTO Doc. G/STR/17 (Nov. 6, 2017). 
132 WTO, Report (2017) of the Working Party on State Trading Enterprises, at 2, WTO Doc. 
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the purpose of STE notifications.133 This contrasted with the WTO Secretariat’s Report on 
China’s TPR which contained much more detailed information on the operation of Chinese 
SOEs and identified certain areas where more information is required. 134  Many WTO 
Members raised questions on Chinese SOEs and requested concrete details of the SOE 
reform, showing a significant shortage of transparency in China’s submissions and a lack of 
knowledge on the (potential) impact of SOEs on trade and competition.135 In the latest TPR 
of China in July 2018, China provided almost no further information on issues relating to 
SOEs including the SOE reform,136 while these issues remained a major matter of concern.137    
In addition, the records of notification of subsidies granted to or through SOEs have also 
been poor in general.138  Collectively, the inadequacy of notifications under the different 
WTO transparency mechanisms reveals the limitations or ineffectiveness of the relevant 
WTO rules in ensuring transparency. The underlying causes of the ineffectiveness have to do 
with, amongst others, the ambiguities in the definition and coverage of STEs, the exclusion of 
confidential information from notifications, and the lack of capacity or incentives of 
Members to collect and provide the required information.139 These causes apply to WTO 
Members in general and do not make China a unique case. Nevertheless, given the role of 
SOEs in the Chinese economy and the complexities in the SOE reform, the lack of 
transparency in the operation, activities, and impact of Chinese SOEs would create more 
acute challenges for the WTO.  
E. Anti-Dumping 
AD is the most frequently invoked policy instrument in dealing with NMEs. When an 
NME is involved in an AD investigation, investigating authorities (“IAs”) may decide to 
replace the price of the subject goods sold in the NME market with a surrogate price of ‘like 
goods’ in a market economy third country for the determination of dumping margins. The 
justification for the use of surrogate prices typically relates to alleged state intervention and 
resultant distortions in the NME market. As the NME price is regarded as having been 
artificially lowered by the government, the surrogate price selected is generally higher than 
the NME price, thereby leading to higher dumping margins and AD duties. By doing so, AD 
duties are used to counteract the injurious effect of state intervention in an NME exporting 
country on the relevant domestic industry of the importing country. 
China has been treated as an NME in many jurisdictions and suffers hefty and often 
inflated AD duties.140 The extent to which the WTO AD rules allow the use of surrogate 
                                                 
133 WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review Report by China, at 12–13, WTO 
Doc. WT/TRP/G/342 (June 15, 2016).  
134 WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review Report by the Secretariat, WTO Doc. 
WT/TRP/S/342 (June 15, 2016).  
135 WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review - China, Minutes of the Meeting, 
paras. 3.19, 4.211, 4.348, WTO Doc. WT/TRP/M/342 (Sep. 26, 2016). See also Robert Wolfe, 
Sunshine over Shanghai: Can the WTO Illuminate the Murky World of Chinese SOEs?, 16 WORLD 
TRADE REV. 713, 721–24 (2017).  
136  WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review Report by China, WTO Doc. 
WT/TRP/G/375 (June 6, 2018).  
137 WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review Report by the Secretariat, WTO Doc. 
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prices has been vigorously debated and remains contentious.141 Instead of fully engaging in 
the debate, our analysis below focuses on the major constraints on the use of AD to tackle 
NME-related issues under the WTO AD rules. 
Like the other WTO rules, GATT Article VI and the AD Agreement are not designed to 
specifically deal with NMEs. Arguably, the only AD rule that does so is set out in the second 
Supplementary Provision to paragraph 1 of GATT Article VI which reads: 
It is recognized that, in the case of imports from a country which has a complete or 
substantially complete monopoly of its trade and where all domestic prices are fixed by 
the State, special difficulties may exist in determining price comparability for the 
purposes of paragraph 1, and in such cases importing contracting parties may find it 
necessary to take into account the possibility that a strict comparison with domestic 
prices in such a country may not always be appropriate.142 
In EC – Fasteners, the AB confirmed that the Ad Note “allows investigating authorities to 
disregard domestic prices and costs of … an NME in the determination of normal value and 
to resort to prices and costs in a market economy third country.”143 However, the AB also 
ruled that surrogate prices and costs may be invoked only when both of the prescribed 
conditions are found to exist in an economy, that is, “the complete or substantially complete 
monopoly of trade and the fixing of all prices by the State”.144 Thus, the Ad Note applies to 
an extreme type of NMEs only and does not apply to other types of NMEs where state 
intervention exists in a lesser degree.145 Given the level of liberalization and competition in 
the Chinese market, any claim that China remains such an extreme type of NME must be 
rejected.146 Commentators have repeatedly and correctly pointed out that the current Chinese 
                                                                                                                                                        
国) [MOFCOM: China has been the primary target of anti-dumping for 21 years], ECON. INFOR. 
DAILY (July 6, 2016), available at http://finance.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0706/c1004-28527586.html 
(last visited Aug. 2, 2018). For a comprehensive volume on the evolvement of the so-called NME 
anti-dumping methodology under the WTO rules and the laws and practices in various major 
jurisdictions using China as a case study, see James Nedumpara and Weihuan Zhou (eds), Non-
Market Economies in the Global Trading System: The Special Case of China (Singapore: Springer, 
2018). 
141 See e.g., Weihuan Zhou, Appellate Body Report on EU-Biodiesel: The Future of China’s 
State Capitalism under the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement 17 WORLD TRADE REV. 609 (2018); 
Jochem de Kok, The Future of EU Trade Defence Investigations against Imports from China, 19 J. 
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The Awkward Space between Market and Non-Market Economies in EC-Fasteners (Article 21.5) 17 
WORLD TRADE REV. 313 (2018). 
142 As shown earlier, this special AD rule was added to the GATT during the Review Session of 
1954-55 to deal with certain NMEs. Article 2.7 of the AD Agreement provides that Article 2 of the 
agreement is ‘without prejudice to’ this Ad Note. The wording ‘without prejudice to’ suggests that the 
interpretation of the other provisions of Article 2 must not ‘detrimentally affect, encroach upon, or 
impair’ the right of WTO Members under the Ad Note. See Appellate Body Report, China—Measures 
Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual 
Entertainment Products, para. 219, WTO Doc. WT/DS363/AB/R (adopted Jan. 19, 2010). 
143 Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on 
Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China, para. 285, WTO Doc. WT/DS397/AB/R (adopted Jul. 28, 
2011) [hereinafter EC—Fasteners]. 
144 Id., FN 460.  
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146  See e.g., David Palmeter, The WTO Antidumping Agreement and the Economies in 
Transition, in STATE TRADING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 115, 117 (Thomas Cottier & Petros 
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economy is at least comparable to many other WTO Members so that the application of the 
Ad Note to China cannot be justified.147 
The remaining question is ‘to what extent the AD Agreement allows the use of surrogate 
prices and costs in dealing with exports from NMEs?’ Under Article 2.2 of the AD 
Agreement, a normal value is generally established by reference to the price of the subject 
goods in the market of the exporting country. However, a surrogate price based on sales in a 
third country or a constructed normal value (“CNV”) may be employed where (1) there is ‘no 
domestic sales of like products in the ordinary course of trade’; or (2) a ‘particular market 
situation’ (“PMS”) exists in the domestic market; or (3) there is ‘low volume of sales in the 
country of exportation’. The third circumstance concerns the technical issue of whether there 
are sufficient sales in the domestic market for the determination of normal values and hence 
is not concerned about state interventions in an NME. The first two circumstances may be 
relevant to the consideration of NME-related issues in AD actions. However, according to the 
AB’s rulings in US – Hot-Rolled Steel, it is submitted that the ‘ordinary course of trade’ 
(“OCT”) test concerns the terms and conditions of sales transactions between enterprises and 
does not concern market distortions caused by state intervention per se.148 In other words, the 
test focuses on distortions arising from commercial activities and not on governmental or 
regulatory activities. For example, the OCT test would apply to the sale of goods by a 
Chinese SOE to a related entity at a price lower than the market value of the goods or on 
terms and conditions more favorable than the sale of the goods to unrelated entities. However, 
whether the sale of the SOE has benefited from subsidies for the production of the goods or 
has been influenced by other government policies may not be relevant to the OCT test. As 
long as the sale is concluded on normal terms and conditions, the existence of state 
interventions in the market would not prevent the sale from satisfying the OCT test. In this 
sense, the OCT test would be of limited use in dealing with market distortions caused by 
government interventions, although the scope of the test is to be further elucidated by the 
WTO adjudicators.149 
Comparing with the OCT test, the PMS test tends to provide more flexibility for 
consideration of state-caused market distortions in AD actions. Due to the absence of a 
definition of PMS under the AD Agreement and the lack of WTO jurisprudence on how the 
term should be interpreted and applied, there is currently little constraint on the discretion of 
IAs to treat state intervention in a market as creating a PMS. However, it is submitted that the 
application of the PMS test to addressing state interventions in NMEs may be limited as 
Article 2.2 does not concern an alleged market situation per se but concerns whether the 
                                                 
147  See e.g., William Watson, Will Nonmarket Economy Methodology Go Quietly into the 
Night?, 1, 8 (Cato Inst. Pol’y Analysis No. 763, 2014); Matthew R. Nicely, Time to Eliminate 
Outdated Non-Market Economy Methodologies, 9 GLOBAL TRADE & CUSTOMS J. 160, 160–61 (2014); 
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market mechanisms around the world”).  
148  Appellate Body Report, United States—Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled 
Steel Products from Japan, paras. 141-148, WTO Doc. WT/DS184/AB/R (adopted Aug. 23, 2001). 
For an analysis of this ruling, see Zhou, supra note 141, at 19-21. 
149 It should be noted that the scope of the OCT test has not been settled, and the WTO tribunals 
have not closed the door for the application of the test to address imports sold at distorted prices. 
WTO Members such as the EU have relied on the test for that purpose. See e.g., Stephanie Noel & 
Weihuan Zhou, Replacing the Non-Market Economy Methodology: Is the European Union’s 
Alternative Approach Justified Under the World Trade Organization Anti-Dumping Agreement? 11 
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existence of the situation has precluded a ‘proper comparison’ between export prices and 
domestic prices of the subject goods.150 Thus, an alleged state intervention or market situation 
would not in itself be sufficient to constitute a PMS; rather, a PMS would exist only if the 
situation has affected the comparability of domestic prices vis-à-vis export prices. This would 
require the situation to have affected the two prices asymmetrically or un-evenhandedly.  
Furthermore, a finding that a PMS exists merely provides a pathway to the application of 
the alternative methodology based on the use of CNV for comparison with export price. The 
level of the CNV (and ultimate dumping margins) would depend on the production cost, the 
administrative, selling and general costs, and profits in relation to the manufacture and sale of 
the subject goods. In practice, WTO Members have predominantly relied on the use of 
surrogate production costs to address state intervention in raw materials markets (e.g. steel 
and aluminum) in NMEs. However, in EU – Biodiesel, the AB has reduced substantially the 
flexibility in applying surrogate production costs for the construction of normal values, 
holding that the existence of governmental regulation and resultant distortions in a raw 
material market does not justify a deviation from the use of the costs actually incurred and 
recorded by the producers/exporters under investigations.151 Thus, producers’ costs must still 
be employed for the calculation of a CNV when state intervention or a PMS is found to exist 
in the raw material market. Towards this end, the only flexibility left in the AB’s rulings (for 
the application of surrogate costs) will need to be based on the OCT test. 152  This was 
confirmed lately by the WTO panel in the US – OCTG (Korea) dispute.153 However, as 
discussed above, the OCT test may not leave sufficient flexibility for consideration of 
government-caused market distortions.  
In short, the special AD rule under the Ad Note to GATT Article VI:1 would not be 
applicable to China. More significantly, the WTO jurisprudence has evolved in a way that 
gradually removes the flexibility for the use of AD to address state intervention and market 
distortions in NMEs. It is sensible to restrict the use of AD in dealing with NMEs as it has 
already resulted in abuses and tit-for-tat AD actions.154 
IV.  USING WTO RULES TO BUILD A MARKET ECONOMY 
Given the limitations of the current rules framework, additional rules are needed to help 
build a market economy in China. Some attempts have been made in China’s WTO accession 
package, where the existing WTO rules are either further refined by more specific rules or 
supplemented by additional obligations. Broadly speaking, they correspond to the general 
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WTO rules discussed in the last section including, inter alia, non-discrimination,155 tariffs, 
taxes and other charges,156 quantitative restrictions,157 transparency,158 and trade remedies.159 
However, many of these tailor-made rules remain general “market access” provisions 
designed to address certain trade barriers in China and hence do not specifically address trade 
distorting behavior of SOEs. Indeed, China’s additional transparency obligations are typically 
broader in scope, more in-depth, and contain more specific and detailed rules; and the 
implementation of most of the transparency obligations did turn out to be satisfactory.160 
However, as discussed in Section III.D, China has not done a good job complying with the 
key obligation relating to SOEs.161 In addition, China’s commitment that Members may treat 
it as an NME in AD actions and apply the so-called NME Methodology in calculating normal 
values has arguably expired on 11 December 2016. 162  This removes the basis for the 
treatment of China as an NME in AD cases and the flexibility to deal with state intervention 
and market distortions in China through AD measures. 
Despite the above, this section discusses China’s specific commitments on subsidies and 
countervailing (“CV”) measures, as well as certain competition-law-type obligations. We 
show how these rules may be interpreted and applied in addressing China’s state capitalism. 
A. “Market Economy” Commitments 
A number of broad commitments on SOEs and price distortions under China’s accession 
instruments have been overlooked and underutilized so far. Specifically, China’s commitment 
under Section 6.1 of the AP goes beyond anti-discrimination by preventing China from 
influencing the commercial decisions of STEs. This commitment is elaborated by Paragraph 
46 of the WPR which states: 
The representative of China further confirmed that China would ensure that all state-
owned and state-invested enterprises would make purchases and sales based solely on 
commercial considerations, e.g. price, quality, marketability and availability, and that the 
enterprises of other WTO Members would have an adequate opportunity to compete for 
sales to and purchases from these enterprises on non-discriminatory terms and conditions. 
In addition, the Government of China would not influence, directly or indirectly, 
commercial decisions on the part of state-owned or state-invested enterprises, including 
on the quantity, value or country of origin of any goods purchased or sold, except in a 
manner consistent with the WTO Agreement. (emphasis added) 
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Unlike GATT Article XVII:1 discussed in Section III.A, Paragraph 46 does not seem to be 
limited to a non-discrimination obligation but provides a more comprehensive restriction on 
the conduct of SOEs and state-invested enterprises (“SIEs”). Specifically, the underlined part 
of the first sentence makes no reference to non-discrimination and requires that the 
“purchases and sales” activities of these entities must be based solely on commercial 
considerations. In Canada – Wheat, the AB endorsed the panel’s interpretation of the term 
“commercial considerations” as “encompassing a range of different considerations that are 
defined in any given case by the type of “business” involved (purchases or sales), and by the 
economic considerations that motivate actors engaged in business in the relevant 
market(s).” 163  Thus, Paragraph 46 may be interpreted in a way that imposes a general 
requirement of commercial behavior on the enterprises concerned 164  in a wide range of 
activities as broad as those covered under GATT Article XVII:1.165 The second sentence of 
Paragraph 46 contains a similarly broad obligation, although the activities covered seem to be 
limited to purchases and sales relating to the quantity, value or country of origin of goods. 
However, an important distinction between the obligations set out in the underlined part and 
the second sentence of Paragraph 46 lies in that the latter refers to the WTO Agreement while 
the former does not. The lack of reference to the WTO Agreement may well mean that the 
exceptions under the GATT may not be invoked to justify any deviations from the former 
obligation. 166  Whether such an ambitious obligation was intended by China during the 
accession negotiations is questionable, as they would overly restrict the capacity of China in 
pursuing regulatory or policy goals via SOEs. It would also seem to be unfair that other WTO 
Members are not subject to such onerous obligations and enjoy “a great deal of regulatory 
freedom [in]… using STEs as instruments of economic policy.” 167  These concerns may 
require an interpretation of Paragraph 46 (and Section 6.1 of the AP) in a cautious and 
restrictive manner so as to pay due deference to China’s regulatory freedom. However, based 
on its text, Paragraph 46 seems to provide abundant flexibilities for WTO Members to 
challenge non-commercial activities of Chinese SOEs. 
Another important commitment made by China is set out in Section 9.1 of the AP which 
reads: 
China shall, subject to paragraph 2 below, allow prices for traded goods and services in 
every sector to be determined by market forces, and multi-tier pricing practices for such 
goods and services shall be eliminated.  
This commitment responds to WTO Members’ concerns about China’s extensive use of price 
controls in various sectors at the time of the accession negotiations.168 Like Paragraph 46 of 
the WPR, this commitment expands far beyond an obligation of non-discrimination and 
applies to all governmental measures on all prices in all sectors other than a few exempted 
ones. The exemptions from this broad obligation are confined to a short list of goods and 
services which may be subject to government pricing or government guidance pricing as 
envisaged in Annex 4.169 Notably, many of the strategic sectors contemplated in China’s 
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policy documents (as mentioned in Section II) and the currently controversial sectors such as 
the steel and aluminum industries are not exempted. Thus, it is arguable that in all of these 
covered sectors including goods and services, China must let the market determine prices and 
must not affect prices directly or indirectly through any measures or intervention. China is 
not allowed to expand the list of exempted sectors “[e]xcept in exceptional circumstances and 
subject to notification to the WTO.”170 This may be understood as strictly confining the 
application of this exception to an extraordinary circumstance which justifies the adoption of 
price controls.171 In addition, since Section 9.1 makes no reference to the WTO Agreement, 
the exceptions permitted under the GATT may not apply. Collectively, the disciplines 
imposed under Section 9.1 and Paragraph 46 are strongly interrelated. While Section 9.1 
prevents the Chinese government from intervening the market, Paragraph 46 requires the 
government to ensure that any such interventions would not be implemented through SOEs or 
SIEs. Given their broad scope, the two obligations may well operate together to provide 
sufficient restraints on state intervention (including via SOEs) so as to address the associated 
market distortions. 
That said, the broad wording of the above provisions means that significant gap-filling 
exercises are required in their interpretation and application. For example, what factors 
should a WTO panel consider in determining whether Chinese prices are market prices or 
whether a decision of an SOE is made purely on commercial basis? How could a complaining 
Member collect sufficient evidence in these aspects since the determination of price and other 
business decisions of enterprises are often confidential? Paragraph 46 and Section 9.1 provide 
little guidance on these matters; and hence their exact scope of application would be subject 
to the development of WTO jurisprudence. A narrow interpretation of key terms such as 
“determined by market forces” and “commercial considerations” would limit the capacity of 
these rules in addressing SOE-related issues. Comparably, the SCM Agreement currently 
offers a more workable mechanism for WTO Members to challenge China’s state capitalism, 
although the utility of Paragraph 46 and Section 9.1 should also be further explored. 
B. Subsidy-countervailing Measures and China-Specific Rules 
Before 11 December 2016, the NME Methodology permitted under Section 15(a) of the 
AP considerably facilitated AD investigations against China and the application of high 
duties, thereby making AD the preferred trade remedy tool. 172  However, this special 
methodology no longer applies. In any case, as argued in Section III.E, despite the 
convenience of using AD measures to deal with NMEs, the WTO AD rules are designed 
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172 Between 1995 and 2014, WTO Members brought 1,050 AD actions against China but 
merely 90 CV actions. More than 90% of the CV actions against China were brought by four WTO 
Members, i.e., the US, Canada, Australia, and the EU. Among them, the US has been the largest user 
with more than half of the CV cases during that period. QIAO XIAOYONG (乔小勇) & LI YIZE (李泽
怡), Shijie Zhuyao Guojia he Diqu Duihua Shishi Fanbutie Diaocha de Xingshi he Yingdui Jucuo (世
界主要国家和地区对华实施反补贴调查的形势及应对举措) [Overview of the Countervailing Duty 
Investigations against China by Main Countries and Regions around the world and Possible 
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mainly to deal with practices of businesses or firms and should not be applied to addressing 
market distortions at the macro level due to state interventions.  
There are other reasons why the US and the EU should resort to CV measures, rather than 
AD measures, if they wish to push for market economy reforms in China. Firstly, the 
provision of subsidies to SOEs or strategic industries remains one of the major obstacles in 
China’s market economy reforms. Thus, CV measures target more specifically the source of 
the distortions created by government interventions.  
Secondly, AD measures usually affect private Chinese firms more, while CV measures by 
definition tend to target SOEs or firms conferred with special rights or privileges. Thus, more 
frequent use of CV measures would place more restraints on SOEs or privileged firms while 
expanding the space for the growth of private firms, which are the main driving force in a 
market economy.  
Thirdly, to address concerns over the large amounts of subsidies granted to SOEs, China 
agreed that subsidies would be regarded as “specific” if SOEs “are the predominant recipients 
of such subsidies or … receive disproportionately large amounts of such subsidies”.173 This 
expands the list of specific subsidies beyond the categories enumerated under Article 2 of the 
SCM Agreement and adds “ownership” as the key criterion for determining specificity. With 
such a tailor-made rule, it would be easier to target SOEs in CV investigations.  
Fourthly, in CV actions, the investigating country has the right to replace Chinese prices 
with external benchmarks in determining the benefits conferred by subsidies under Section 
15(b) of the AP. This provision states: 
In proceedings under Parts II, III and V of the SCM Agreement, when addressing 
subsidies described in Articles 14(a), 14(b), 14(c) and 14(d), relevant provisions of the 
SCM Agreement shall apply;  however, if there are special difficulties in that application, 
the importing WTO Member may then use methodologies for identifying and measuring 
the subsidy benefit which take into account the possibility that prevailing terms and 
conditions in China may not always be available as appropriate benchmarks.  In 
applying such methodologies, where practicable, the importing WTO Member should 
adjust such prevailing terms and conditions before considering the use of terms and 
conditions prevailing outside China. (emphasis added) 
Unlike the NME Methodology, this right is not subject to an expiration date. This important 
difference lends strong support to the view that CV actions were originally intended to be the 
preferred solution to address system-wide distortions in China due to its unique economic 
system. Arguably, it is precisely because of the lack of relevant rules on NMEs under the 
SCM Agreement that Section 15(b) was created to deal with the situation where no 
marketplace benchmarks are available or readily accessible in China.174 As we will argue 
below, Section 15(b) and the new developments in China’s SOE reform would make it easier 
to solve three major problems surrounding the use of CV rules against Chinese SOEs. 
1. Availability of information  
Practically speaking, China’s commitment under Section 15(b) provides great convenience 
for WTO Members in CV investigations as it would facilitate the determination of benefits 
conferred by subsidies and hence the magnitude of the subsidies under Article 14 of the SCM 
Agreement. Being able to apply external benchmarks in determining whether an alleged 
subsidy confers benefits to the recipients of the subsidy, it would be much easier for IAs to 
                                                 
173 AP, supra note 86, Section 10.2.  
174 See Julia Ya Qin, WTO Regulation of Subsidies to State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) – A 
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find the existence of such benefits and a higher amount of subsidies. To begin with, there is 
almost no bar to the invocation of the right to use external benchmarks as the only condition 
seems to be that “special difficulties” exist in using Chinese prices. As the scope of “special 
difficulties” is not defined or circumscribed in any way, there is considerable latitude for IAs 
to decide that such difficulties exist. This latitude should be contrasted with the carefully-
crafted conditions on the use of external benchmarks under the general rules of Article 14 of 
the SCM Agreement. In US — Softwood Lumber IV, the US authority applied external 
benchmark prices in determining adequacy of remuneration under Article 14(d) on the 
ground that Canadian prices of stumpage did not reflect competitive market prices.175 The AB 
ruled that under Article 14(d), external benchmarks may be applied only if IAs have 
considered the suitability of private prices in the country of provision and have substantiated 
that such prices are distorted as the government plays a predominant role in providing the 
relevant goods.176 In US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), the AB clarified 
that if the government is merely a significant (rather than predominant/dominant) supplier of 
the goods concerned, IAs must consider further evidence to “prove distortion of private 
prices”.177  The evidentiary burden on IAs under Article 14(d), therefore, is significantly 
heavier than that under Section 15(b). Accordingly, the AB repeatedly emphasized that “the 
possibility under Article 14(d) for investigating authorities to consider a benchmark other 
than private prices in the country of provision is very limited.”178 Such limitations do not 
seem to exist under Section 15(b) as the presence of “special difficulties” is not confined to 
the government being a predominant supplier. Rather, such “special difficulties” could 
arguably be either systemic difficulties resulted from the distortions created by government 
interventions in the whole market, or practical difficulties in obtaining or verifying the 
information on subsides. For example, it may exist in cases where it is hard for IAs to collect 
evidence on whether an SOE has received a benefit from subsidies or on the magnitude of 
such benefit. In other words, CV measures may be justified in cases of insufficient disclosure 
or lack of notification by China. This could solve a major problem in CV investigations, 
which have been plagued by the failure of the government of the exporting countries to 
provide information or reliable information. Indeed, what constitute “special difficulties” 
remains unsettled and may or may not be interpreted as broadly as suggested above. However, 
a reading of “special difficulties” as allowing more flexibility for IAs than Article 14(d) does 
is valid.   
Furthermore, under normal WTO rule, when an external benchmark is applied, 
adjustments of the benchmark, in relation to “price, quality, availability, marketability, 
transportation and other conditions of purchase or sale”, are required under Article 14(d) to 
ensure that it reflects the prevailing market conditions in the country of provision.179 In US – 
Carbon Steel (India), an adjustment was required so as not to affect the comparability of the 
selected benchmark with the relevant Chinese prices.180 In contrast, such an adjustment is not 
                                                 
175  Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Countervailing Duty Determination with 
respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, para. 77, WTO Doc. WT/DS257/AB/R, (adopted 
Feb. 17, 2004) [hereinafter US—Softwood Lumber IV]. 
176 Id., para. 90. 
177Appellate Body Report, United States—Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties 
on Certain Products from China, para. 479, WTO Doc. WT/DS379/AB/R (adopted 25 Mar. 25, 2011) 
[hereinafter US—Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China)]. 
178 Appellate Body Report, US—Softwood Lumber IV, supra note 175, para. 102. 
179 Id., para. 106.   
180 Appellate Body Report, United States—Countervailing Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled 
Carbon Steel Flat Products from India, paras. 4.151, 4.211, WTO Doc. WT/DS436/AB/R (adopted 
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mandatory under Section 15(b) as it merely uses best-endeavours language in requesting (as 
opposed to requiring) IAs to consider adjustments only when “practically possible”, although 
what amounts to “practicable” may vary from case to case. Thus, the textual difference 
between Section 15(b) and Article 14(d) would at least lead to a less strict interpretation of 
the former on the requirement of adjustments. In sum, Section 15(b) provides additional 
rights and flexibilities for IAs in employing external benchmarks to determine the existence 
and magnitude of subsidies, making it easier for the application of CV measures. This is 
significant as it allows IAs to determine that the Chinese government has provided/purchased 
goods or services at a price less/higher than adequate remuneration as long as they encounter 
“special difficulties” in relying on the Chinese prices.  
The same can be said of policy loans provided by state banks to SOEs or firms in strategic 
sectors. In US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), the AB ruled that in 
determining whether a benefit has been conferred by a government loan under Article 14(b), 
external benchmarks may be used only “in the absence of an actual comparable commercial 
loan that is available on the market” of the country of provision due to distortions in the 
interest rates on the loan resulted from government intervention. 181  When an external 
benchmark loan is applied, adjustments must be made to ensure that it “approximates the 
comparable commercial loan which the firm could actually obtain on the market.”182 These 
mandatory requirements do not seem to apply under Section 15(b) either. Thus, for anti-
subsidy measures to be imposed, IAs do not have to determine whether the interest rates 
concerned are distorted by the Chinese government. Rather, they may simply rely on the lack 
of information or difficulties in collecting sufficient information, amongst other difficulties, 
to trigger the application of external benchmarks.  
2. The “public body” issue  
Anti-subsidy measures may be applied only when the subsidy is provided by a government 
or a public body or an entrusted private body under Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement. In his 
influential article exploring China’s unique economic structure and the efficacy of the 
existing WTO rules in tackling China’s state capitalism, Mark Wu treated the determination 
of “which Chinese enterprises, banks, and entities” are “public bodies” as a primary 
challenge to the application of the SCM Agreement. 183  For Wu and many others, this 
challenge became particularly acute after the US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties 
(China) dispute184 in which the AB ruled that a public body “must be an entity that possesses, 
exercises or is vested with governmental authority” and “the mere fact that a government is 
the majority shareholder of an entity does not demonstrate that the government exercises 
meaningful control over the conduct of that entity”.185 This ruling downplays the value of 
state ownership or interest in an entity as a criterion in a “public body” determination, and 
emphasizes on whether the entity has the authority to function as an extension of the 
government. Compared with the “ownership-based” approach, the “authority-based” 
                                                 
181 Appellate Body Report, US—Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), supra note 
177, para. 487. 
182 Id., para. 488.   
183 See Mark Wu, The “China, Inc.” Challenge to Global Trade Governance, 57 HARV. INT'L 
L.J. 261, 301-05 (2016). 
184 Id. See also e.g., Ru Ding, ‘Public Body’ or Not: Chinese State-Owned Enterprise, 48 J. 
WORLD TRADE 167 (2014); Michel Cartland, Gerard Depayre & Jan Woznowski, Is Something Going 
Wrong in the WTO Dispute Settlement?, 46 J. WORLD TRADE 979, 1001–14 (2012).  
185 Appellate Body Report, US—Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), supra note 
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approach apparently imposes a higher evidentiary burden on IAs to establish “public body”. 
Critics of the AB’s ruling concerned that the “authority-based” approach has erected a 
difficult barrier to the determination of “public body”, thereby creating loopholes for 
subsidies granted through SOEs to circumvent the WTO disciplines.186  
However, we believe that the “authority-based” approach leaves ample room for IAs to 
find a Chinese SOE or SIE as “public body”, especially under China’s current SOE reform. 
In US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), the AB has observed that “the 
absence of an express statutory delegation of authority [does not] necessarily preclude a 
determination that a particular entity is a public body.”187 The AB directed IAs, in applying 
the “authority-based” approach, to evaluate “core features of the entity” and “its relationship 
with government”.188 The AB elaborated:  
“In some instances, … where the evidence shows that the formal indicia of government 
control are manifold, and there is also evidence that such control has been exercised in a 
meaningful way, then such evidence may permit an inference that the entity concerned is 
exercising governmental authority.”189 
In applying its rulings, the AB accepted the US’s finding of China’s state-owned commercial 
banks as “public bodies” mainly based on evidence relating to (1) state ownership, (2) laws 
that mandate implementation or consideration of government policies, (3) influence of the 
government or the Party on the management and decision-making.190 
China’s current SOE reform has provided most of the evidence necessary for an 
affirmative finding of “public bodies”. As discussed at length in Section II, the SOE 
classifications constitute an explicit designation of authority for Public Welfare SOEs to 
undertake government functions in the provision of public goods and services, and for 
Special Commercial SOEs to play a significant role in selected industries so that they 
contribute to the implementation of national strategies, the protection of national security, and 
the development of strategic industries. The government’s meaningful influence on these 
entities may be readily inferred according to the limitations on private equity, the mandates 
on activities, the criteria for performance evaluation, the involvement of SASAC and the 
Party in management and decision-making, etc. While General Commercial SOEs are 
intended to operate as private entities, they may also undertake government functions in 
certain cases, particularly when they are involved in the investment in strategic sectors as 
SCIOs. 
In this regard, it is worth reiterating that the role of the Party in the decision-making of 
SOEs have been explicitly recognized and strengthened in recent years. A measure issued by 
the SASAC Party Committee on 3rd January 2017 elaborated that the power of the Party 
Committee includes to: 
1. deliberate and discuss major issues concerning the reform, development, stability of the 
company, and major operational and managerial issues. Before the Board of Directors 
decides major issues concerning the company, it shall first seek advice from the Party 
                                                 
186 See Cartland, Depayre & Woznowski, supra note 184, at 1008, 1010–02; Wu, supra note 
183, at 303–05. In our view, the AB’s approach is reasonable as it attempts to avoid the over-reaching 
of “public body” to cover all SOEs or SIEs. If one accepts that SOEs or SIEs may operate as private 
entities, then the “ownership-based” approach is too broad to distinguish SOEs or SIEs acting on 
behalf of governments from those operating solely in their own interest. 
187 Appellate Body Report, US—Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), supra note 
177, para. 318. 
188 Id., paras. 317, 345.   
189 Id., para. 318. 
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Committee of the company. More specifically, according to the principle of “Party 
assuming the responsibility for cardres’ affairs”, the Party Committee shall deliberate on 
the nominations by, and provide advices and suggestions, or make nominations to the 
Board or the CEO. It shall also valuate the proposed appointees along with the Board, 
and provide advices and suggestions; and 
2. ensure the implementation of guidelines and polices of the Party and the State by the 
company, the implementation of major strategic decisions by the Party Central 
Committee and the State Council, and key working arrangements of the SASAC Party 
Committee and upper-level Party committees.191 
While this measure only applies to Central SOEs, similar actions have been taken by SOEs at 
the provincial and municipal levels.192 These documents confirm two things: first, the Party 
controls the SOEs; and second, the Party uses such control to ensure the achievement of 
various state policies by the SOEs. One might argue that the Party is not the same as the 
government or the State. However, any lingering doubts one might have on the separation 
between the Party and the State must be dispelled when China’s Constitution was amended in 
early 2018 with the following addition in paragraph 2 of Article 1, “[t]he defining feature of 
socialism with Chinese characteristics is the leadership of the Communist Party of China.” 
With the Party leading the State, the control of the Party is equivalent to the control of the 
State.  
In summary, even under the “authority-based” approach, there is sufficient ground for a 
finding that SOEs are “public bodies” given the new developments in China’s ongoing SOE 
reform. 
3. Will CV measures provide sufficient remedy? 
In the end, one might wonder whether the shift to CV measures would provide sufficient 
remedy to domestic industries. However, as noted in Bown’s comparison of the rates in the 
US AD/CV cases involving China, the average CV duty rates tend to be higher than the 
average AD rates.193  If we also factor in the fact that even such AD rates are somewhat 
inflated due to the application of the NME Methodology, the differences are likely to be 
much larger when the NME Methodology can no longer be applied. Another interesting fact 
is that the differentials of the average rates between Chinese and non-Chinese firms are much 
larger in CV cases than AD cases. While one may interpret this to mean that China is more 
                                                 
191 GUANYU JIAKUAI TUIJIN ZHONGYING QIYE DANGJIAN GONGZUO ZONGTI YAOQIU NARU 
GONGSI ZHANGCHENG YOUGUAN SHIXIANG TONGZHI (关于加快推进中央企业党建工作总体要求
纳入公司章程有关事项的通知) [NOTICE ON RELEVANT ISSUES CONCERNING THE ACCELERATION OF 
THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE INCORPORATION OF THE OVERALL REQUIREMENTS OF CENTRAL SOES 
PARTY-BUILDING INTO COMPANY CONSTITUTIONS] (PROMULGATED BY THE PARTY COMMITTEE 
ORGANIZATION DEPARTMENT OF SASAC (GUOZI DANGWEI DANGJIAN [2017] NO. 1), EFFECTIVE JAN. 
1, 2017). 
192 See e.g., STATE-OWNED ASSETS SUPERVISION & ADMIN. COMMISSION OF YINCHUAN CITY 
at http://gzw.yinchuan.gov.cn/tztg/201707/t20170711_267788.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2018); 
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193 See Chad Bown, Should the United States Recognize China as a Market Economy?, at 6–8 
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likely to provide subsidies compared to other WTO Members, this could also be taken as 
support for a stronger role that CV actions may play in providing protection against unfair 
trade practices by China. A more aggressive use of CV measures will probably deter China 
from encouraging further expansion and entrenchment of SOEs. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Since the start of the economic reform in 1978, China’s SOEs have gone a long way. 
While many were on the brink of bankruptcy at the beginning of the reform, nowadays the 
SOEs have become bigger, stronger, and more profitable. Many of them are now leading 
players in key sectors, and rank high in both domestic and international league tables. With 
such a remarkable turnaround, one cannot help but recall the prescient language in China’s 
1982 Constitution that SOE “is the leading force in the national economy”.194 
This article has conducted a detailed examination of the contours of China’s current SOE 
reform. While we have yet to fully fathom the implications of the reform, it is safe to say that 
it aims at further advancement and enhancement of the SOEs in key strategic sectors. 
Domestically, this is very likely to lead to the corresponding retreat of private firms. As these 
SOEs rear their head at the international level, the future does not bode well for firms from 
the other parts of the world either.  
How then, should we deal with the resurgence of state capitalism in China? Many 
suggestions have been made, but they all assumed that the existing WTO rules are 
insufficient. Some worries that the key players will start to look for alternatives, and this 
would lead to weakening of the multilateral trading system.195 Policymakers have also started 
to take action. For example, on the sidelines of the eleventh WTO Ministerial Conference in 
Buenos Aires last year, the US, the EU, and Japan agreed in a joint statement to “enhance 
trilateral cooperation in the WTO and in other forums” to address the “critical concern” about 
the “severe excess capacity in key sectors exacerbated by government-financed and 
supported capacity expansion, unfair competitive conditions caused by large market-
distorting subsidies and state owned enterprises”. 196 On 31 May 2018, the three countries 
further issued a joint scoping paper to push for the development of stronger rules on 
industrial subsidies and SOEs.197 
The problem with these approaches, however, is that there is no guarantee that China will 
agree to the new rules, at least not without being offered sufficient compensation. Moreover, 
what China resents the most is being singled out.198  That is why China balked at the fateful 
July meeting in 2008 when the US requested it to provide additional concessions on special 
products in agriculture and sectoral negotiations on industrial goods, even though the same 
was not expected from other emerging economies such as India and Brazil.  
Instead, as this article has argued, to tackle the problems created by China’s SOEs, we do 
not necessarily need new rules. Rather, the WTO’s existing rules on subsidies, coupled with 
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the China-specific obligations, do provide sufficient defense against the encroachment of 
Chinese SOEs beyond its own shores. Unfortunately, China’s additional commitments to 
restraining government intervention in the market and trade-distorting conducts of SOEs have 
never been used. Equally importantly, for too long, the rules on subsidies remain 
considerably underutilized due to three common misconceptions regarding the utility of these 
provisions. In this paper, we have set the record straight by addressing each of the three 
misconceptions. The first misconception is that CV actions are impossible without sufficient 
information about the subsidies programs in China. Our response is that the open-ended 
language of “special difficulties” in Section 15(b) of the AP does provide wide leeway to IAs 
in applying CV measures against China, especially in cases where the information is lacking, 
insufficient, or otherwise difficult to obtain. The second misconception is that the AB’s 
narrow interpretation of “public body” as one with government authority has rendered it very 
difficult for IAs to find SOEs as “public bodies”. We argue that this is no longer the case with 
China’s designation of certain SOEs as exercising key governmental functions and its push to 
install Party Committees in SOEs and to enhance their roles in the decision-making of SOEs. 
These moves have made it much easier to find the exercise of government authority by these 
SOEs and the control of the government in these firms. The third misconception is that CV 
actions are ineffective in practice. However, we believe that CV measures tend to provide 
higher margins of protection compared to AD measures. Moreover, with the expiration of the 
NME Methodology, the current set of inflated AD rates can no longer sustain. This leaves 
CV measures the only meaningful option.   
Thus, the real problem is not the lack of rules to tackle China’s state capitalism, but the 
lack of utilization of existing rules. If WTO Members, especially the major players, can start 
bringing well-coordinated CV investigations domestically and “big, bold” cases 199 
challenging China’s subsidies and SOEs at the WTO, they will not only help to level the 
playing field for the firms from other countries, but also help China to steer its SOE reform 
back to the right course, as has originally been charted by the reform pioneers like Deng and 
Jiang more than thirty years ago. 
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